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A Reliability Check on Expert 
Witness Testimony in Medical 
Malpractice Litigation: 
Mandatory Medical Simulation 
Julie L. Campbell† 
Abstract 
Leading scholars have claimed that the medical malpractice system 
is working based on studies that estimate the error rate—the rate at 
which juries come to the wrong conclusion and erroneously hold a 
provider liable—to be less than twenty percent. But the injured 
plaintiff, who tends to lose a potentially meritorious case nearly fifty 
percent of the time, and the innocent medical provider, who is forced 
to settle a case in which no negligence occurred, deserve better. Part of 
the problem is exclusive reliance on flawed medical experts to establish 
the standard of care. In the past, this was justified because there was 
no other means to establish the standard of care. However, new 
technology has changed that. As the practice of medicine has become 
more evidence-driven, we can now use data to extrapolate the standard 
of care. 
This Article describes how medical simulation can be used to 
further decrease the error rate in medical malpractice cases. High-
hazard industries around the world have utilized simulation technology 
to identify and reduce errors. Medical simulation is similarly capable of 
identifying medical negligence and reducing future medical errors. By 
expanding medical providers’ periodic recertification examinations to 
include medical simulation scenarios, and hiding actual medical 
malpractice fact patterns within these simulations, three tort reform 
objectives are achieved: (1) impartial experts provide the basis for 
standard of care; (2) the standard of care is based on multiple data 
points instead of two conflicting opinions; and (3) the simulation acts 
as a training module to help prevent future medical errors. 
This solution—which would require minimal statutory changes—
holds the promise of reducing the error rate of jury verdicts in medical 
malpractice cases and ultimately decreasing the cost and improving the 
quality of health care in the United States. 
 
†  J.D., L.L.M., Highland Park, Illinois; MacLean Center for Clinical 
Medical Ethics Fellow; the 2019–2020 Health Law Fellow in the American 
Medical Association’s Litigation Center, an Education Committee 
member for the Illinois Association for Healthcare Attorneys, and adjunct 
professor teaching in the area of health law and medical ethics. 
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Introduction 
To prove a claim of medical malpractice, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that a doctor failed to act with the skill and care that a 
similarly-trained health care professional would have demonstrated 
under the circumstances.1 In other words, the doctor must have 
breached the standard of care. Proving the standard of care is crucial 
to most medical malpractice cases—and it is almost always done 
through eliciting testimony from expert witnesses.2 
The process, however, is highly flawed. The use of conflicting 
medical experts, both of whom receive substantial monetary 
compensation3 and are vulnerable to the effects of hindsight bias, leave 
the trier of fact judging credibility rather than scientific fact. As a 
result, the use of expert witness testimony to establish the standard of 
care in medical malpractice litigation often fails to provide statistically 
significant, and at times, reliable information from which a trier of fact 
can deduce the appropriate standard of care. 
Relatedly, in the current system, malpractice cases drag on for 
years, are enormously costly, demoralizing for health care providers, 
and are frustrating and emotionally traumatic for patients and their 
families. The average medical malpractice claim takes anywhere from 
two to five years from the date of injury to settlement or verdict.4 The 
cost to prosecute or defend a medical malpractice claim can be in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars depending on the complexity of the 
case and the number of expert witnesses needed to prove the applicable 
standard of care, resulting in fifty-four percent of the compensation paid 
to the plaintiff actually being absorbed by the administrative costs of 
 
1. BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND 
LITIGATION § 24:1 & 24:15 (2d ed. 2019). 
2. Id. § 24:81. 
3. Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts & Compensation, 67 TENN. L. REV. 909, 934 (2000).  
4. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in 
Med. Malpractice Litig.,354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2031 (2006) (finding 
that the average time between injury and resolution was five year with 
one in three claims taking six years or more to resolve); Anupam B. 
Jena, Amitabh Chandra, Darius Lakdawalla & Seth Seabury, Outcomes 
of Medical Malpractice Litigation Against US Physicians, 
172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 892, 893 (2012) (“The mean time required 
to close a malpractice claim was 19.0 months; 11.6 months and 25.1 
months were required for nonlitigated and litigated claims, respectively. 
Each step in the litigation process generated significant delays in the 
resolution of the claim. Among litigated claims, those dismissed in court 
required the least time to close (mean, 20.4 months). Claims that were 
not dismissed but were resolved before a verdict took considerably longer 
to close (mean, 28.5 months). Claims that were resolved at trial took the 
longest to resolve (mean, 39.0 and 43.5 months for cases with verdicts in 
favor of defendants and plaintiffs, respectively).”). 
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bringing the claim.5 The emotional impact a malpractice lawsuit has on 
providers has caused some to leave the profession altogether.6 For the 
patients and/or their families, the discovery and trial process are 
emotional battlefields where they are forced to relive the unfortunate 
events time and time again.7 
Worse yet, imagine enduring all the above and then being 
confronted with an outcome that is not justified by the facts of the case, 
but instead was based on the opinion of a single individual who, to a 
jury, seemed more credible. This can result in two possible verdicts that 
are detrimental to greater societal interests: (1) a patient receiving no 
compensation for negligent care which caused bodily injury and 
impairment of life; or (2) a medical provider being found liable for 
negligence when his care comported with the applicable standard. Both 
results challenge society’s belief in the justice system, and just as 
equally, society’s trust in the medical system. According to at least one 
study, twenty-seven percent of malpractice cases result in incorrect 
verdicts.8 We can do better. 
This Article takes on the problem of expert witness reliability. It 
offers a novel solution whereby expert testimony could be supported by 
a statistically relevant data set drawn from unbiased, qualified, and 
tested sources—with the least possible cost to patients, health care 
providers, and health care systems. It does not argue that expert 
witnesses should be eliminated and does not challenge the use of a trier 
of fact to determine liability. Rather, it seeks to improve the current 
system by introducing the use of mandatory medical simulation. 
Mandatory medical simulation is a procedural tool that trial courts can 
utilize to better extrapolate the standard of care to apply to medical 
malpractice cases. It holds the promise of reducing the error rate of jury 
 
5. Studdert et al., supra note 4, at 2031 (noting administrative costs include 
the combination of defense costs and standard contingency fees charged 
by plaintiffs’ attorneys which are typically in the range of 35 percent of 
the indemnity payment). 
6. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Med. Among High-Risk Specialist 
Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Env’t, 293 JAMA 2609, 2613 (2005) 
(finding that of the 425 respondent-physicians surveyed, the most 
common reports of restrictions on practice involved stopping the practice 
of medicine altogether or eliminating specific high-risk procedures). 
7. See Jena et al., supra note 4, at 892 (noting patient are affected by 
anxiety as a result of the lengthy resolution process and the delay in 
receiving compensation for injuries). 
8. Studdert et al., supra note 4, at 2028 (finding 73 percent (1054 of 1441) of 
all claims for which determinations of merit were made had outcomes 
concordant with their merit. Discordant outcomes in the remaining 27 
percent of claims consisted of three types: payment in the absence of 
documented injury (6 of 1441 [0.4 percent of all claims]), payment in the 
absence of error (10 percent), and no payment in the presence of error (16 
percent)). 
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verdicts in medical malpractice cases and ultimately decreasing the cost 
and improving the quality of health care in the United States. 
This Article consists of four parts. The first Part highlights how the 
current procedural process is vulnerable to ethical downfalls and 
conflicts of interest, the frequency of incorrect jury verdicts in the 
medical malpractice context, and how federal courts address the issue 
of reliability of medical expert testimony in other areas of law. The 
second Part addresses how subjectivity and unreliability in determining 
the appropriate standard of care to apply in medical malpractice claims 
negatively impacts healthcare providers, the health care system, and 
patients’ access to the judicial system. The third Part highlights how 
current attempts at tort reform have been unable to address the issues 
of subjectivity and unreliability and failed to garner the support of 
either the plaintiff or defense counsels. The final Part makes the case 
for reform. It argues for the use of mandatory medical simulation as a 
tool equivalent to mediation in helping to illustrate to the parties and 
the trier of fact the appropriate standard of care to apply in a given 
case. Medical simulation holds the promise of improving the credibility 
of the legal system and ultimately the quality of care in medicine. 
I. Reliance on Conflicting Expert Witness Testimony 
In Medical Malpractice Cases Results In Unreliable 
Jury Verdicts 
It is generally recognized that for a plaintiff to succeed in a medical 
malpractice lawsuit she must prove four elements: (1) a doctor-patient 
relationship existed in which the provider owed the patient a duty of 
care; (2) the medical provider breached that duty of care by providing 
substandard medical care to the patient/plaintiff; (3) the substandard 
care proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury; and (4) the extent of the 
plaintiff’s damages as a result of sustaining those injuries.9 
Of particular importance to this Article is the second element, the 
breach of the duty of care. Duty of care is defined as “[t]he duty of the 
physician [ ] to exercise that degree of care, knowledge, and skill 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by the average member of the 
profession practicing in the field.”10 Establishing the applicable 
standard of care typically requires testimony from a paid expert 
witness.11 The purpose of expert testimony is to assist the trier of fact 
 
9. LINDAHL, supra note 1, § 24:1. 
10. Id. § 24:15. 
11. Id. § 24:81; cf. id. § 24:82 (2d ed. 2019) (highlighting various scenarios 
where expert witness testimony is not necessary —”common knowledge” 
and “gross negligence” exceptions to the general rule). 
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in understanding issues that require scientific or specialized knowledge 
or experience beyond the scope of common occurrences.12 
The qualifications necessary to establish the witness as an expert 
vary by jurisdiction, but in most cases an expert witness must satisfy 
two requirements: (1) have actual knowledge and experience in the 
relevant area through either active practice or teaching; and (2) either 
be in the same profession as the defendant whose conduct is at issue or 
qualify for the exception to the “same profession” requirement of the 
applicable expert-witness statute.13 In addition, some jurisdictions have 
a statutory requirement that the witness spend a minimum amount of 
time in a given period in actual clinical practice.14 If the plaintiff is 
unable to present expert testimony to the effect that a violation of the 
applicable standard has occurred, the medical malpractice claim will 
typically be defeated.15 Thus, the ability to retain a qualified medical 
expert is essential to most medical malpractice cases. 
Unfortunately, in the current American legal system, these experts 
require substantial compensation for their services.16 This results in a 
possible conflict of interest. By receiving payment in return for his 
expert opinion, the medical expert has a financial incentive in seeing 
the case progress through the legal system. The longer a case is in the 
court system, the more billable work the expert will presumably 
provide, and the more money he will make. Billable work includes 
reviewing the medical records, preparing written opinions, and if 
needed, providing testimony at depositions and trial, all of which could 
be perceived as creating an inherent bias towards whichever side 
retained the expert.17 
In addition to a financial conflict of interest, the testimony of expert 
witnesses can be tainted by hindsight bias. Hindsight bias “is a person’s 
tendency to judge past decisions in light of one’s current knowledge of 
the outcome; it is a cognitive heuristic that distorts one’s ability to 
 
12. Arlen v. Ohio State Medical Bd., 61 Ohio St. 2d 168, 173 (1980) 
(discussing why a medical expert is not necessary in cases before a medical 
licensing board, as opposed to cases presented to a jury of laypersons who 
lack the specialized knowledge or experience necessary to understand the 
facts). 
13. LINDAHL, supra note 1, § 24:83 (noting that ”[t]he question of whether a 
witness qualifies as an expert is a matter addressed to the sound discretion 
of the trial judge”). 
14. LINDAHL, supra note 1, § 24:83 (noting provisions like this are is intended 
to prevent “professional witnesses”). 
15. LINDAHL, supra note 1, § 24:81. 
16. Douglas R. Richmond, Expert Witness Conflicts and Compensation, 
67 TENN. L. REV. 909, 934 (2000). 
17. See id. at 914, 922-23. 
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judge the true probability of a particular outcome.”18 Creeping 
determinism, commonly associated with the cognitive strategy of 
understanding hindsight bias, “describes a person’s tendency to 
automatically incorporate outcome information into his understanding 
of the pre-existing circumstances.”19 Simply put, knowing the outcome 
taints the ability to objectively consider all the facts of the story.20 This 
is because, people tend to prioritize certain facts and deprioritize others 
based on which facts will lead to the known outcome.21 One type of 
judgment researchers have found to be particularly vulnerable to 
hindsight bias is negligence.22 
A study conducted by Musch and Wagner in 2007 concluded that 
“experts might be more prone to perceiving an event as foreseeable in 
hindsight than laypeople because (a) they particularly like to present 
themselves as knowledgeable, and (b) they may find it easier to arrive 
at a judgment due to their experience.”23 Thus, hindsight impairs one’s 
ability to objectively judge the foreseeability of the outcome.24 A more 
 
18. Debra L. Worthington et al., Hindsight Bias, Daubert, and the Silicone 
Breast Implant Litigation: Making the Case for Court Appointed Experts 
in Complex Medical and Scientific Litigation, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 154, 155-56 (2002) (noting that for jurors, “(b)ecause the outcome 
information is readily available to them, jurors in lawsuits turn to it as a 
simple matter of cognitive efficiency. Thus, when outcome knowledge is 
available, jurors use it as a “shortcut” around the complexity of the 
information presented and thereby simplify their decision-making task. 
People lacking advance knowledge of the outcome, however, do not have 
the same bias, and are more capable of objectively assessing the conduct 
at issue.”). 
19. Id. at 155. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 155–56. 
22. Aileen Oeberst & Ingke Goeckenjan, When Being Wise After the Event 
Results in Injustice: Evidence for Hindsight Bias in Judges’ Negligence 
Assessments, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 271, 272–73 (2016) (A 2016 
study conducted to determine whether hindsight bias played a role in 
judges’ determination of criminal negligence. Researchers noted that, 
“negligence would be more frequently affirmed with the benefit 
of hindsight than from the foresight perspective (i.e., the defendant’s 
perspective at the time of action).”). 
23. Id. at 273. 
24. Id. at 271 (citation omitted) (“A long and prolific research tradition in 
psychology has established that our perceptions of events change once 
these events have occurred. In hindsight, people overestimate what they 
could have known in foresight.  Specifically, hindsight bias comprises of 
three different components: increased perceptions of inevitability (e.g., “It 
must have happened”); increased perceptions of foreseeability (e.g., “I 
knew it would happen”); and memory distortions (e.g., “I predicted that 
it would happen.”). 
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objective assessment of conduct is achieved by ensuring that the 
reviewer does not know the outcome of the case or story.25 
In order to achieve a judicial system in which jury verdicts are fair 
and reliable, the verdicts must first be based on evidence and testimony 
that is accurate, objective, and removed from any conflict of interest. 
The next section discusses what predictability and reliability mean in 
the context of jury verdicts, why medical malpractice jury verdicts are 
often not predictable and reliable, and how federal courts have handled 
the issue of reliability when it comes to scientific expert testimony. 
A. Justice and Fairness Require Predictability and Reliability 
Predictability and reliability are key terms associated with the 
concept of justice and fairness. This is because these terms imply some 
sort of objective standard is being applied to the adjudication of the 
dispute. To the lay person, predictability means, “consistent repetition 
of a state, course of action, behavior, or the like, making it possible to 
know in advance what to expect.”26 Reliability means, “the ability to 
be relied on or depended on, as for accuracy, honesty, or achievement.”27 
While these terms are important, the most crucial term to understand 
is interrater reliability. This form of reliability measures the degree of 
agreement between different people observing or assessing the same 
thing.28 Interrater reliability is important because people are subjective, 
so different observers’ perceptions of situations and phenomena 
naturally differ.29 Interrater reliability aims to minimize subjectivity as 
much as possible by ensuring that different professionals are able to 
replicate the results of an experiment in a consistent manner.30 The key 
element in improving objectivity through interrater reliability in the 
context of medical malpractice cases is increasing the number of 
individuals reviewing the results. 
While the practice of medicine is premised on intensive research 
leading to predictable, reliable, and objective results for patient 
outcomes, the American legal system is based on the premise that a 
disinterested and passive fact finder, or trier of fact, is the best means 
 
25. Worthington et al., supra note 18, at 156. 
26. Predictability, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ 
pred ictability?s=t [https://perma.cc/GZ6L-3RZH]. 
27. Reliability, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ 
reliability?s=t [https://perma.cc/VR3Q-KLYM]. 
28. Fiona Middleton, Types of Reliability and How to Measure Them, 
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of demonstrating neutrality.31 During a trial, the parties are responsible 
for producing all the evidence upon which the decision will be based.32 
As a result, the parties are motivated to find and present their most 
persuasive evidence.33 
Unfortunately, in the context of medical malpractice litigation, the 
most persuasive evidence tends to come from conflicting expert witness 
opinions, leaving the trier of fact in a position of judging credibility 
more than the reliability or predictability of the evidence. As Clark 
Havighurst has said, “realism compels recognition that juries are often 
poorly positioned to choose reliably between the well argued, but often 
highly confusing, theories of the two sides’ experts . . . [and] often fall 
back on such irrelevancies as the witnesses’ demeanor and style of 
presentation or sympathy for the plaintiff’s plight or the defendants’ 
reputation.”34 
By very definition, there can be no interrater reliability in a system 
where the parties’ most persuasive evidence comes from the 
contradictory testimony of two paid expert witnesses. As a result, the 
notions of predictability, reliability, and, most importantly, objectivity 
are completely absent from the adjudication of a medical malpractice 
case. If our judicial system is truly to be a neutral forum, we must 
ensure that the facts presented to the trier of fact are free from conflicts 
of interest and not the products of hindsight bias. In essence, the facts 
must be predictable and reliable. 
B. Reliance on the Testimony of Expert Witnesses Alone Leads to 
Incorrect Jury Verdicts in Medical Malpractice Cases 
Perhaps because expert testimony is neither predictable nor 
reliable, juries often reach incorrect conclusions in medical malpractice 
cases.35 In fact, one study found that juries reached the wrong result a 
whopping twenty-seven percent of the time -- meaning that juries either 
found no guilt where medical experts later determined negligence 
occurred, or found guilt where experts later determined no mistake was 
made.36 And it is not that physicians are predisposed to favor other 
 
31. DALE A. NANCE, LAW AND JUSTICE 295 (Carolina Acad. Press, 2d ed. 
1999) (noting that the American adoption of the principles of neutrality 
and passivity tends to commit the adversary system to the objective of 
resolving disputes rather than searching for material truth). 
32. Id. By making the parties responsible for the presentation of facts, it 
focuses the litigation on the ”questions of greatest importance to the 
parties.” 
33. Id. 
34. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 1018 (2d 
ed. 1998). 
35. Studdert, et al., supra note 4, at 2028. 
36. Id. 
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physicians.37 In fact, they disagreed with jury verdicts that held both 
for and against the defendant physician. 38 
In the Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS), researchers 
developed methods to identify adverse events and estimate their 
frequency.39 The researchers utilized the incidence of adverse events to 
evaluate whether the tort system was effective in rewarding those who 
were injured as a result of their treatment in hospitals and to assess the 
economic impact of such injuries.40 The HMPS method for identifying 
adverse events was based on a two-stage chart review.41 The first stage 
was conducted by nurses who screened patient records to determine 
which records likely included an adverse event.42 Selected charts were 
then reviewed by physicians to confirm the presence of adverse events 
and to assess the extent to which these events indicated substandard 
care.43 Researchers found that when only two teams of physicians 
evaluated the medical case, there was a higher degree of disagreement 
on whether negligence occurred.44 However, when numerous sets of 
physicians reviewed the case, the ability to obtain consensus in the 
results was greater.45   
Important to note about the HMPS is that the process of and 
criteria for making decisions about causation and negligence in the 
study differ from what occurs in civil litigation.46 In a scientific study, 
 
37. Bryan A. Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical 
Error: A Paradigm of Cooperation Between Patient, Physicians, and 
Attorney, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 541, 551–52 (2000) (noting that lay people are 
actually better at predicting jury verdicts than medical professionals). 
38. Id. at 551. 
39. G.R. Baker, Harvard Medical Practice Study, 13 BMJ QUALITY AND 
SAFETY, 151, 151–52 (2004). 




44. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in 
Hospitalized Patients – Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I. 
324 N ENGL. J. MED. 370, 374 (1991) (noting that their pilot test, which 
showed a higher degree of reliability on judgments of negligence, involved 
numerous sets of physicians). 
45. Id. 
46. A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and 
Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study III. 325 N. ENGL. J. MED. 245, 249 (1991) (“Our reviewers 
sometimes disagreed about causation and negligence; when only one found 
negligence, the case did not qualify as an adverse event due to 
negligence . . . In a lawsuit, a single expert opinion might be sufficient to 
support a finding of negligence; under our protocol it would not . . . Thus, 
our findings are not directly comparable to the results of civil litigation.”). 
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when only one medical reviewer found negligence, a case did not qualify 
as an adverse event due to negligence. 47 However, a single expert 
opinion in a medical malpractice lawsuit might be sufficient to support 
a finding of negligence.48 
Since the HMPS, two decades of social science research on the 
outcomes of medical malpractice claims have occurred. According to 
Philip Peters, legal scholar and expert on medical malpractice law and 
medical malpractice reform, these studies support the findings that 
physicians win eighty to ninety percent of the jury trials with weak 
evidence of medical negligence, approximately seventy percent of the 
borderline cases, and even fifty percent of the trials in cases with strong 
evidence of medical negligence.49 These same studies show that 
claimants with low-odds claims receive a settlement of some kind in 
approximately ten to twenty percent of cases.50 
Peters concludes that, “given the limits of human capacity to 
reconstruct past events and the inevitable subjectivity of judgments 
about the quality of past performance, it is probably not possible to 
design a fault-based adjudication system that will have a substantially 
higher degree of accuracy.”51 The federal judicial system does not seem 
to agree, and over the years has instituted measures to improve the 
reliability and relevance of scientific expert opinions. The next Part will 
address several measures federal courts have created to reinforce the 
reliability of expert testimony. 
C. Federal Courts Require More Than Conflicting Expert Opinions to 
Find Liability 
It doesn’t have to be the case that conflicting expert testimony 
forms the sole basis for finding liability. Federal courts have found a 
different way. False Claims Act (FCA) cases provide one example. 




49. Philip G. Peters, Twenty Years of Evidence on the Outcomes of 
Malpractice Claims, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 352, 
355 (2008) (analyzing two decades of social science research on the 
outcomes of medical malpractice claims and their correlation to the 
quality of care provided to the patient as judged by other physicians); see 
also Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Med. Malpractice 
Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 
886, 888 (2002) (finding insurer offered to settle in 96% of cases in which 
it concluded that the standard of care was breached; plaintiffs received 
money in 93% of those cases. Plaintiffs received money in only 15% of the 
cases in which the insurer concluded that the standard of care was not 
breached and in 37% of the cases in which the insurer was uncertain).  
50. Peters, supra note 49, at 355. 
51. Id. at 357. 
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between physicians, without more, is not enough to show falsity.52 The 
federal courts recognize that reasonable minds may differ regarding 
medical judgments and conclusions and therefore finding liability in 
such instances would not be fair.53 In so holding, the courts make the 
very true statement that “liability may not be premised on subjective 
interpretations of imprecise statutory language such as ‘medically 
reasonable and necessary.”54 Instead, federal courts adjudicating FCA 
cases employ a deeper analysis looking to medical association guidelines, 
the opinions of other physicians, and the claims data suggesting the 
defendant is an outlier, in addition to the conflicting expert testimony.55 
In the early 1990s, when adjudicating product liability cases, the 
United States Supreme Court determined potential expert witness 
testimony requires separate scrutiny before being admissible during a 
trial.56 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court 
concluded that federal trial judges must ensure that expert’s testimony 
 
52. United States v. AseraCare Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2019) 
(holding “[A] reasonable difference of opinion among physicians reviewing 
medical documentation ex post facto is not sufficient on its own to suggest 
that a physician’s clinical judgment regarding the patient’s illness, or any 
claims for Medicare hospice benefits based on them, are false, as would 
trigger False Claims Act (FCA) liability under the false-certification 
theory; a properly formed and sincerely held clinical judgment is not 
untrue even if a different physician later contends that the judgment is 
wrong.”). 
53. U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., No. 2:16-cv-00304-JNP-EJF, 
2017 WL 237615, at *8–9 (D. Utah Jan. 19, 2017), rev’d, 895 F.3d 730 
(10th Cir. 2018) (A physician relator alleged that the 
defendant cardiologist performed unnecessary medical procedures and 
then fraudulently billed the federal government for some of these 
procedures). 
54. Id. at 10. 
55. U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 743 (10th Cir. 
2018) (holding that a FCA claim was properly stated where, 
“Dr. Polukoff alleges: (1) Dr. Sorensen performed an unusually large 
number of PFO closures (‘The Cleveland Clinic reported that it had 
performed 37 PFO closures in 2010; during that same time period [Dr.] 
Sorensen’s billing records indicate that he had performed 861.’); (2) these 
procedures violated both industry guidelines and hospital guidelines; (3) 
other physicians objected to Dr. Sorensen’s practice; (4) Intermountain 
eventually audited Dr. Sorensen’s practice, and concluded that its 
‘guidelines had been violated in many of the 47 cases reviewed;’ and (5) 
‘Dr. Sorensen knew that Medicare and Medicaid would not pay for PFO 
closures to treat migraines, so he chose to represent that the procedures 
had been performed based upon indications set forth in the AH[A]/ASA 
stroke guidelines—the existence of confirmed recurrent cryptogenic 
stroke.’) (citation omitted). 
56. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (a product 
liability case in which mothers of infants born with birth defects sued the 
pharmaceutical drug company responsible for production of the 
medication). 
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both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.57 
In so recognizing, the Court coined the Daubert analysis, a standard to 
test the reliability and credibility of expert testimony.58 The essence of 
the Daubert analysis is to ensure that the evidence admitted is not only 
relevant, but also reliable.59 Under the Daubert analysis, expert 
testimony is deemed reliable if it passes muster under the following five 
factors: (1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be or has been 
tested-- that is, whether the expert’s theory can be challenged in some 
objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory 
approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability; (2) whether 
the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and publication; 
(3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when 
applied; (4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls; 
and (5) whether the technique or theory has been generally accepted in 
the scientific community.60 
While federal courts seem to be aware of the inherent danger of 
utilizing conflicting expert testimony alone to prove the scientific truth 
of a matter, state courts within the context of medical malpractice cases 
have not yet adopted this same level of concern.61 As a result, 
establishing the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is 
vulnerable to an unreliable, unpredictable process of eliciting conflicting 
testimony from paid medical experts and leaving the trier of fact to 
assess which expert is more credible. The resulting high rate of error in 
medical malpractice jury verdicts has severe consequences not only for 
providers but also for the patients in the healthcare system. 
 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 59–295. 
59. Id. at 589; see also Oeberst & Goeckenjan, supra note 22, at 277 
(explaining that one option to improve the reliability of expert witnesses 
is to only provide them with information that was available to the 
Defendant when they acted, eliminating hindsight bias). 
60. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–95 (1993). 
61. Nicole Hines, Why Technology Provides Compelling Reasons to Apply a 
Daubert Analysis to the Legal Standard of Care in Medical Malpractice 
Cases, 5 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 9 (2006) (noting that the Sixth Circuit 
in Dickenson v. Cardiac & Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn, P.C., 388 F.3d 
976 (6th Cir. 2004) and the Appeals Court of Massachusetts and later the 
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916 
(Mass. 2006) both overturned lower court decisions applying 
the Daubert standard saying that the standard of care is determined by 
the care customarily provided by other physicians and that it does not 
have to be scientifically tested or proven effective). 
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II. When juries get it wrong: the negative 
consequences on the Healthcare provider, the 
Healthcare system, and the injured patient 
When juries get it wrong in a medical malpractice case, it can have 
far reaching implications for both medical providers and patients. This 
Part focuses on the negative impacts that incorrect jury verdicts have 
on healthcare providers and consequently the healthcare system, as well 
as the patients. 
A. The Fact That Juries So Often Get It Wrong Affects Healthcare 
Provider Employability and Encourages The Practice of Defensive 
Medicine 
Healthcare providers, especially physicians, spend years and 
hundreds of thousands of dollars obtaining the necessary knowledge and 
skills to care for patients. According to the American Medical Student 
Association (AMSA), the average medical student loan debt in 2014 
was $176,348 with close to forty-three percent of those accruing more 
than $200,000.62 An incorrect jury verdict, finding negligence where 
none actually existed, can severely jeopardize a healthcare provider’s 
ability to find gainful employment and put this investment at risk. 
Unlike typical negligence cases, where the damages or penalties are 
limited to monetary awards, healthcare providers are potentially liable 
for large sums of money and also face mandatory reporting to the 
National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).63 While having to pay out a 
large sum of money is unfair when the provider did nothing wrong, the 
vast majority of providers have malpractice insurance to cover this 
expense.64 Unfortunately, there is no security net to prevent the 
mandatory reporting to the NPDB. 
The NPDB is a web-based database of reports “containing 
information on medical malpractice payments and certain adverse 
 
62. What’s the real cost of medical school?, AM. MED. STUDENT ASS’N 
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.amsa.org/2018/11/10/real-cost-of-medical-
school/ [https://perma.cc/S3RL-9F8R]. 
63. The Health Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) 
(2018) (requiring ”[e]ach entity (including an insurance company) which 
makes payment under a policy of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise 
in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a judgment 
in, a medical malpractice action or claim [to] report . . . information 
respecting the payment and circumstances thereof [to the NPDB].”). 
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actions involving healthcare practitioners, providers, and suppliers.”65 
The NPDB was established to prevent “practitioners from moving state 
to state without disclosure or discovery of previous damaging 
performance.”66 Information that must be reported to the NPDB 
includes: (1) the name of any physician or licensed health care 
practitioner for whose benefit the payment was made; (2) the amount 
of the payment; (3) the name (if known) of any hospital with which the 
physician or practitioner was affiliated or associated; and (4) a 
description of the acts or omissions and injuries or illnesses upon which 
the action or claim was based.67 
In addition to the initial reporting, hospitals are required to query 
the NPDB whenever a physician applies for staff membership or 
privileges, and once every two years for physicians on staff or having 
privileges at that hospital.68 As a result, being reported to the NPDB 
can have a significant impact on the future employability of healthcare 
providers. With ten to twenty percent of medical malpractice cases 
resulting in a payout despite weak evidence of substandard care,69 and 
any payout triggering the mandatory reporting to the NPDB, the only 
safety net left to providers to try and prevent this reporting is to 
practice defensive medicine. 70 The next section of the Article will 
address the various types of defensive medicine employed by providers 
to avoid medical malpractice claims and the negative impacts defensive 
medicine has on the healthcare system. 
1. The Practice of Defensive Medicine Can Cause Providers to Order 
Unnecessary Tests or Refuse to Practice in Certain Specialties or High 
Liability Areas 
The term “defensive” typically indicates a situation in which the 
participants to an activity are no longer working together as a team. 
The application of this term to the practice of medicine is no different. 
“Defensive medicine is a deviation from sound medical practice that is 
induced primarily by a threat of liability.”71 David Studdert and his 
colleagues identified two types of provider behavior associated with the 
practice of defensive medicine: (1) assurance behavior; and (2) 
 




67. 42 U.S.C. § 11131(b) (2018). 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a) (2018). 
69. Peters, supra note 49, at 355. 
70. BARRY R. FURROW, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 347–
48 (Jesse H. Choper et al. eds., 8th ed. 2018). 
71. Studdert et al., supra note 6, at 2609.  
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avoidance behavior.72 According to Studdert, “assurance behavior, also 
termed ‘positive defensive medicine’, involve[s] supplying additional 
services of marginal or no medical value with the aim of reducing 
adverse outcomes, deterring patients from filing malpractice claims, or 
persuading the legal system that the standard of care was met.”73 
Avoidance behavior, also known as “negative” defensive medicine 
involves providers’ efforts to distance themselves from sources of legal 
risk by either not taking on patients with complex medical conditions 
or electing to not practice in high-risk specialties.74 
In a study conducted by researchers at the Harvard School of Public 
Health and Columbia Law School involving 824 physicians in high risk 
specialties (emergency medicine, general surgery, neurosurgery, 
obstetrics/gynecology, orthopedic surgery, and radiology), ninety-three 
percent admitted that they sometimes or often engage in defensive 
medicine, and forty-two percent had in fact restricted the scope of their 
clinical practice due to liability concerns.75 Of the defensive medicine 
tactics used by the physicians surveyed, over half admitted to ordering 
more diagnostic tests than were medically necessary or referring 
patients to other specialists when not indicated.76 A third of physicians 
admitted to prescribing more medications than medically necessary, 
and that same proportion reported suggesting invasive procedures that 
were not warranted.77 
According to Studdert, the increased frequency of defensive 
medicine since the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970s is due in large 
part to the “social costs of instability in the malpractice system.”78 
Michael Frakes and Jonathan Gruber were able to study practitioners’ 
tendency to engage in defensive medicine by focusing on the no-liability 
system employed in the Military Health System.79 Frakes and Gruber’s 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id.; see also Liang, supra note 37, at 553. 
74. Studdert et al., supra note 6, at 2609; see also Liang, supra note 37, at 
553–54 (noting that when doctors choose to avoid high-risk patients or 
procedures it creates an access problem, meaning patients will now have 
more difficulty in obtaining care and subsequently increase the risk 
of these patients being injured). 
75. Studdert et al., supra note 6, at 2612; Jena et al., supra note 4, at 893. 
76. Studdert et al., supra note 6, at 2612. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 2617. 
79. Michael Frakes & Jonathan Gruber, Defensive Medicine: Evidence from 
Military Immunity, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 197, 198-99 (2019) 
(“Pursuant to a long-standing and highly controversial federal law, active 
duty patients seeking medical treatment from active duty physicians at 
military facilities have no recourse under the law—i.e., they can sue 
neither the physician nor the government—should they suffer harm as a 
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research noted “suggestive evidence that liability immunity reduced 
inpatient spending by five percent with no measurable negative effect 
on patient outcomes,”80 illustrating a causal connection between 
exposure to liability and increased ordering of unnecessary tests. While 
the most common form of defensive medicine, ordering unnecessary 
imaging studies, is merely costly and wasteful, other behaviors result in 
reduced access to care and, in the case of unnecessary invasive 
interventions, may even pose risks of physical harm to patients.81 
2. The Practice of Defensive Medicine is Directly Related to the 
Increased Cost of Healthcare 
A 2003 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
report estimated the cost of defensive medicine at between $70 and $126 
billion per year.82 According to the American Medical Association 
(AMA), if you applied this figure to health spending in 2015 ($3,205.6 
billion), this would suggest a range of $160 and $289 billion per year.83 
A more recent and conservative approach put the cost of defensive 
medicine in 2008 at $45.6 billion per year84 with extrapolation to 2015 
health spending resulting in a range of $120.0 and $215.9 billion.85 
Regardless of the method used to quantify the expense defensive 
medicine places on our health care system, the figures are staggering. 
According to researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health, 
Harvard Medical School, and Columbia Law School, measures to reduce 
the practice of defensive medicine should focus on “educating physicians 
 
result of negligent medical care. Malpractice protections are afforded, 
however, to dependents and retirees treated at military facilities and to 
all patients—active duty or not—that receive care from civilian facilities. 
By comparing those patients over which physicians are not subject to 
“defensive medicine” pressure to other patients over which physicians are 
subject to such pressure, we can identify the impact of defensive medicine 
pressure on practice patterns, medical costs, and patient outcomes”). 
80. Id. at 197, 229. 
81. Studdert et al., supra note 4, at 2617; see also Liang, supra note 37, at 
553–54 (noting that defensive medicine has the negative consequences of 
exposing patients to a greater possibility of medical error from 
unnecessary testing and interventions, as well as creating an access to 
health care issue when providers opt to avoid high-risk procedures to 
minimize their liability exposure). 
82. OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW 
HEALTH CARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM TO 
IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE, 11 (2003). 
83. Medical Liability Reform NOW! The Facts You Need to Know to Address 
the Broken Medical Liability System, AM. MED. ASS’N, 1, 7 (2018). 
84. Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability 
System, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1569, 1571 (2010). 
85. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 83, at 7. 
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on the appropriate care in clinical situations, developing and 
disseminating clinical guidelines that target common areas of defensive 
medicine, and reducing the financial and psychological vulnerability of 
physicians in high-risk specialties” caused by exposure to medical 
malpractice liability.86 
B. The Potential for an Inaccurate Jury Verdict Makes Access to the 
Legal System Very Difficult for the Majority of Injured Patients 
It is not just doctors who are harmed by the inaccuracy of medical 
malpractice jury verdicts. Patients are equally harmed. If one were to 
ask a plaintiff’s attorney whether the legal system adequately addresses 
and compensates injured patients, the answer would almost 
undoubtedly be “no.”87 As the Harvard Medical Practice Study and the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, “To Error is Human” illustrates, 
the vast majority of negligent injuries never surface as claims.88 Many 
reasons have been postulated for this outcome: 89 (1) the effects of 
medical liability reforms, such as pretrial screening panels, acting as a 
barrier to bringing claims; (2) the unwillingness of plaintiffs’ attorneys 
to expend the large amount of resources necessary to bring a claim if 
the outcome is uncertain;90 and (3) the difficulty of finding physicians 
to certify cases or act as expert witnesses because they find it hard to 
judge whether a standard of care has been met and as a result are 
 
86. Studdert et al., supra note 4, at 2617. 
87. Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the Am. Med. Liability 
Sys., 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 185 (2014) (noting that in response to survey 
questions to plaintiffs’ attorneys, “[t]he responses reveal that the majority 
of screened cases, even strong cases, are rejected if the expected damage 
award is not large enough to offset litigation costs. Thus, the survey 
confirms that access to justice is a significant problem in today’s medical 
liability system”). 
88. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS 
HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. 
eds., 2000). 
89. See Localio et al., supra note 46 (postulating that few injured patients file 
claims because: (1) they have adequate health or disability insurance 
benefits and do not wish to spoil a longstanding relationship with 
their physician; or (2) may regard their injuries as minor and not worth 
the cost; or (3) find attorneys repugnant; or (3) have a difficult time 
finding an attorney to file a case; or lastly (4) because the patients fail to 
recognize they were the victim of negligent care). 
90. Adam C. Schaffer et al., Rates and Characteristics of Paid Malpractice 
Claims Among US Physicians by Specialty, 1992–2014, 177 JAMA 710, 
715 (2017) (noting the reasons plaintiffs’ attorneys are unwilling to take 
a case may be related to smaller potential payouts because of either the 
risk of loss or the administrative costs of bringing the suit increasing due 
to liability reforms such as the pretrial screening panels); see 
also Shepherd, supra note 87, at 185–86.  
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
Mandatory Medical Simulation 
19 
inherently biased toward finding no negligence.91 As a result, 
malpractice attorneys for plaintiffs, typically proceeding under a 
contingent fee arrangement, decline to take at least eighty percent and 
sometimes up to ninety percent of the cases offered to them.92 
Of the claims that are filed, the civil-justice system infrequently 
compensates injured patients and rarely identifies and holds health care 
providers accountable for substandard medical care.93 Among cases 
going to verdict, eight out of ten are judged in favor of the physician.94 
A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine on 
malpractice claims noted that claims associated with error and injury 
that did not result in compensation were substantially more common, 
with one in six claims involving errors receiving no payment.95 The 
possibility of this outcome adds to the larger phenomenon of “the great 
majority of patients who sustain a medical injury as a result of 
negligence do not sue.”96 Either the plaintiffs regard their injuries as 
minor, or consider the small chance of success not worth the cost.97 
When a patient is victorious in a medical malpractice suit, fifty-
four cents for every dollar spent on compensation goes to administrative 
expenses (including the lawyer’s contingency fee, expert witness costs, 
and court costs). 98 Meaning, the injured patient ultimately receives less 
 
91. Brennan et al., supra note 44, at 374-75; see also BARRY A LINDAHL, 
MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 24:81 (2d ed. 2019) 
(noting that the plaintiff often faces a most formidable obstacle in finding 
an expert witness to testify due to the strong reluctance of doctors to 
testify against each other for fear that they risk ostracism by fellow 
practitioners and the cancellation of their public liability insurance 
policy). 
92. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and 
Tort Reform: It’s the Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1102–
03 (2006); see also Shepherd, supra note 87, at 185–86 (finding that “the 
majority of attorneys reject between 95% and 99% of the cases they 
screen. In fact, 76.8% of the attorney respondents indicate that they reject 
more than 90% of the cases they screen. This percentage is remarkably 
consistent with results from another report of medical malpractice 
attorneys’ practice patterns, which found that 77.1% of attorneys accept 
fewer than 10% of the cases they screen”).   
93. Localio et al., supra note 46 (finding that the number of patients in New 
York State who had serious, disabling injuries each year as a result of 
clearly negligent medical care who did not file a claim was 5400 and 
exceeded the number of patients who did file malpractice claims (3570), 
and postulating that only half of those who did file a claim actually 
received compensation). 
94. Jena et al., supra note 4, at 893. 
95. Studdert et al., supra note 4, at 2031. 
96. Id. at 2025. 
97. Localio et al., supra note 46. 
98. Studdert et al., supra note 4, at 2024. 
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than half of the jury verdict or settlement. So many plaintiffs question 
whether it is worth the time, energy, and emotional expense pursuing 
a malpractice claim that will likely take anywhere from two to five 
years before any resolution is reached.99 
Even more troubling, both crude and standardized rates of adverse 
events increase with age. Meaning that elderly people are at a higher 
risk of an adverse event and care for the elderly less frequently meets 
the standard expected of reasonable medical practitioners.100 Although 
the elderly are more likely to encounter substandard care, they are also 
the least likely to find an attorney willing to bring a malpractice claim 
on their behalf.101 This is due to: (1) the imposition by states of damages 
caps for non-economic damages;102 and (2) the lower damages typically 
awarded by juries for patients who are near the end of their lives and 
who no longer have family members dependent on their financial 
earning abilities.103 Thus, the individuals who utilize the healthcare 
system the most are both: (1) the most likely to be exposed to an 
adverse event; and (2) the least likely to be compensated for the injuries 
associated with the medical error. 
As a result of the possibility of an incorrect jury verdict, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys prefer to take cases where the liability is overwhelmingly 
obvious and the patient is either (1) a child now facing a life of disability 
or (2) an adult male in the prime of his life with a family who financially 
depends on him. 104 This leaves a majority of patients who are the victim 
 
99. Id. at 2026, 2031. 
100. Brennan et al., supra note 44, at 373 (finding that people over the age of 
64 were at a higher risk of an adverse event associated with negligence). 
101. See, e.g., Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: 
Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1280 (2004) 
(“Economic loss damages to compensate for past or future wage loss and 
health care expenses are the most fundamental type of damages and have 
been relatively immune from attack by the proponents of tort reform. 
However, this type of damages provides the most benefit to higher wage 
earners, and thus women, minorities, and the poor receive lesser amounts 
of economic loss compensation than more economically well off white 
men.”). 
102. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the 
Link Between Damage Caps and Access to the Civil Justice 
System, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 644 (2006) (citing an article in the Texas 
Lawyer written after the state passed HB 4, a statute capping 
noneconomic damages, in which plaintiffs’ attorneys are quoted saying, 
“HB 4 has slammed the courthouse doors shut on those who can least 
afford it—children, stay-at-home moms and the elderly”); see 
also Finley, supra note 102, at 1280 (finding “Women tort victims, the 
elderly, particularly elderly women, as well as children who suffer the 
ultimate injury of death, are all disproportionately disadvantaged by a 
cap on noneconomic loss damages”). 
103. Finley, supra note 101, at 1281. 
104. Id. at 1280. 
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of medical error without access to the legal system where they can seek 
compensation for their injuries. 
To improve the quality of care in the U.S. health care system, 
medical malpractice reform efforts need to focus on reducing the 
financial and psychological vulnerability of medical providers and 
improving the access of patients who are the victims of medical error. 
Incorrect jury verdicts have the very real potential of reducing the 
employability of competent providers and creating insurmountable 
barriers for injured patients to seek redress in the courts. The next Part 
addresses the current reform efforts aimed at addressing these issues 
and why they have come up short of their intended goals. 
III. Current tort reform efforts do not do enough to 
address jury inaccuracy 
The current medical malpractice legal system is criticized by both 
plaintiffs and defendants for being extremely costly, inefficient, 
protracted, and unfair. Decades of reform efforts have had little impact 
on addressing these criticisms. This Part of the article discusses several 
reform efforts which have attempted to address the reliability of expert 
witness testimony and the predictability of jury verdicts. 
A. Reform Efforts to Increase Reliability, Patient Claims, and Speed of 
Resolution in Medical Malpractice Cases 
Recent efforts to improve the reliability of establishing and 
applying the correct standard of care in medical malpractices cases have 
involved the application of the Daubert standard to expert witness 
testimony in state court cases, the creation of health courts, and the 
use of mandatory arbitration. 
In applying the Daubert analysis to state medical malpractices 
cases, the main objective is to ensure that the testimony is scientifically 
based rather than on a single expert’s notion of what is common 
practice in the medical profession.105 The main objectives in the health 
court and mandatory arbitration initiatives are to increase patient 
access to the legal system, improve the accuracy and consistency of 
judgments, reduce the time it takes to resolve claims, and help resolve 
issues with reliance on paid expert witnesses.106 The following explains 
 
105. Hines, supra note 61, at 7 (“Applying a Daubert analysis resolves many 
of the weaknesses with the traditional customs standard. It ensures that 
expert opinion is grounded in scientifically sound principles and 
methodologies. Published research suggests the finding is 
methodologically sound because the work has ‘weathered peer review’”). 
106. Philip G. Peters Jr., Health Cts.?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227, 249–50, 258–59 
(2008) (citing Innovative Solutions to Med. Liability: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy & Com., 109th 
Cong. 46 (2006) (statement of Michelle Mello, Associate Professor of 
 
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
Mandatory Medical Simulation 
22 
why these reforms may be helpful, but do not ultimately fix the 
problems they intend to fix. 
1. Application of the Daubert Standard in Medical Malpractice Cases is 
Limited to the Causation Element of Negligence 
Traditionally, state courts apply the “customary practice” standard 
when determining the legal standard of care to apply in medical 
malpractices cases.107 This standard requires that physicians exercise 
the skill and judgment ordinarily exercised by those in a 
similar practice of medicine.108 The Daubert analysis, on the other hand, 
focuses on medical evidence that is scientifically-based. 
According to the Daubert analysis, expert testimony is evaluated 
using five factors: (1) whether the expert’s technique or theory can be 
or has been tested-- that is, whether the expert’s theory can be 
challenged in some objective sense, or whether it is instead simply a 
subjective, conclusory approach that cannot reasonably be assessed for 
reliability; (2) whether the technique or theory has been subject to peer 
review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of the 
technique or theory when applied; (4) the existence and maintenance 
of standards and controls; and (5) whether the technique or theory has 
been generally accepted in the scientific community.109 
When matters involving complex scientific concepts are presented 
at trial in federal courts, a court may choose to apply Daubert-level 
scrutiny to the testimony of experts in order to establish the testimony’s 
reliability and relevance.110 Some state courts have attempted to apply 
the Daubert analysis to the testimony of treating physicians.111 This has 
been successful when the physician is testifying as to causation, a 
scientific conclusion.112 However, the application of the Daubert analysis 
 
Health Policy and Law, Department of Health Policy and Management, 
Harvard University)); Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of 
Malpractice Arb., 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 208–09, 214 (1996).  
107. LINDAHL, supra note 1, § 24:15; James Knoll & Joan Gerbasi, Psychiatric 
Malpractice Case Analysis: Striving For Objectivity, 34 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY L. 215, 216 (2006) (stating that the customary practice 
standard “emphasizes the physician’s responsibility . . . to practice in a 
manner that is consistent with others in the field”). 
108. Id. § 24:83. 
109. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592–95 (1993). 
110. Id. 
111. See Thompson v. Cooper, 290 P.3d 393, 399–400 (Alaska 2012); 
Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 921–23 (Mass. 2006). 
112. See Michael B. Kent Jr., Daubert, Doctors and Differential Diagnosis: 
Treating Medical Causation Testimony as Evidence, 66 DEF. COUNS. 
J. 525 (1999). 
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to the standard of care element of a medical malpractice case has 
generally proved to be an unsuccessful venture.113 
Daubert has been used in two specific ways when determining the 
standard of care within the medical malpractice context: (1) to exclude 
expert opinion testimony that is grounded on incorrect factual 
assumptions; or (2) to ensure that the expert’s opinion regarding the 
standard of care is based on valid science.114 Unfortunately, many of the 
trial court decisions in which Daubert was utilized in these manners 
were later reversed on appeal as the higher courts continued to apply 
the traditional standard of customary practice.115 
The one exception in which higher courts allow the Daubert analysis 
in medical malpractice cases is when the expert testifies to a scientific 
fact that is relevant to the standard of care.116 For example, an expert’s 
opinion about increased risk, like diagnosis and causation, may involve 
the application of science to the patient’s case and therefore require a 
Daubert analysis.117 Thus, while the application of Daubert to the 
medical malpractice arena is an admirable attempt at improving the 
reliability of the expert testimony, its use in state courts is generally 
limited to the causation element of the negligence claim.118 
2. Health Courts Promote the Right Goals but with the Wrong Process 
Health courts take malpractice claims out of the traditional court 
system and allow them to be handled by an administrative process. The 
administrative process utilized in the health courts has a number of key 
differences from the traditional court system. First, instead of juries, 
health courts rely on specially trained health care judges, and plaintiffs 
 
113. Palandjian, 842 N.E.2d at 924–26; see also Dickerson v. Cardiac & 
Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn, P.C., 388 F.3d 976, 982 (6th Cir. 2004).  
114. Hines, supra note 61, at 7. 
115. See Hines, supra note 61, at 7. 
116. See Berk v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 380 F.Supp.2d 334 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005). See also Sullivan v. United States Dep’t of the 
Navy, 365 F.3d 827, 833–34 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that although the 
Ninth Circuit held the trial court applied an excessively rigid Daubert 
analysis, the court still embraced applying Daubert to the standard of 
care even if the scientific text does not explicitly corroborate the expert’s 
testimony). 
117. See Berk v. St. Vincent’s Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 380 F.Supp.2d 334, 
343 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005). 
118. See, e.g., Rankin v. Stetson, 749 N.W.2d 460 (Neb. 2008). See also Leila 
H. Watson, Surviving a Daubert Challenge in a Medical Negligence 
Case, 2 AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. 1635 (2007) (concluding “that while 
Daubert may be a hurdle in medical malpractice cases, it is not one of the 
same height and girth as in products liability cases.”). 
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are not required to be represented by an attorney.119 Second, a plaintiff 
has to prove only that his injury could have been avoided if best 
practices had been followed, rather than satisfying the more difficult 
standard that physician negligence contributed to the injury.120 Third, 
compensation for injuries is based on expert evidence rather than a jury 
decision.121 Fourth, compensation decisions establish precedents that 
judges can look to in making decisions about similar future cases.122 
Finally, guidelines are in place to assist in assigning damages.123 
In crafting the health court reform initiative, drafters seized on four 
problems with the current system: the negligence standard, victims’ low 
rate of claiming, the inaccuracy and inconsistency of judgments, and 
the system’s sometimes-protracted delays.124 Advocates suggest that 
health courts would produce better outcomes through the use of 
specialist judges, guidance from neutral medical experts, and greater 
reliance on practice guidelines to clarifying the standard of care and 
increase the consistency of verdicts.125 These lofty goals would be 
achieved by: (1) requiring judges to issue written opinions that would 
both guide future clinical practice and set precedent for future legal 
disputes; (2) defining the standard of care using evidence-based practice 
guidelines that have been issued by credible medical authorities; and 
(3) identifying common mishaps for which compensation would be 
presumptively available (“accelerated compensation events” (ACEs)).126 
 
119. Michelle M. Mello et al., ”Health Courts” and Accountability for Patient 
Safety, 84 MILBANK Q. 459, 460 (2006). 
120. Id. at 460–61. 
121. Id. at 461. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: 
Lessons From the VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV 1631, 1649 (2015). 
125. Peters, supra note 106, at 243, 248–49 (first citing Michelle M. Mello 
et al., “Health Cts.” & Accountability for Patient Safety, 84 Milbank Q. 
459 (2006); then citing Innovative Solutions to Med. Liability: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Energy & Com., 109th 
Cong. 46 (2006) (statement of Michelle Mello, Associate Professor of 
Health Policy and Law, Department of Health Policy and Management, 
Harvard University)). 
126. Id. at 249–51 (suggesting that, “[t]his combination of written opinions, 
binding practice guidelines, and ex ante identification of common 
compensable events could make it much easier for physicians to conform 
their clinical practices to the standard of care and also could enable health 
courts to render more consistent decisions post hoc.” But conceding that, 
“any improvements they produce are likely to be modest. Given the many 
sources of uncertainty in medical practice, there is simply a limit to the 
detail with which legal standards of conduct can be articulated in 
advance”) (footnote omitted). 
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Unfortunately, the health court plan has considerable downsides. 
First, the plan carries the imprimatur of physician and industry bias. 
The health court reform requires an eligible claim to be reviewed first 
by the hospital, health care system, or insurer at issue for the initial 
determination of liability.127 It is only when the patient contests the 
determination by the provider or insurer that he or she may seek redress 
in the health court.128 Once within the health court, an administrative 
law judge replaces the jury and selects, in most cases, a single medical 
expert to advise the court on the nature of the injury and whether it is 
compensable.129 The expert also weighs in on the appropriate amount 
of compensation.130 Finally, non-economic damages are capped 
according to a predetermined schedule based on public deliberation 
about reasonable compensation.131 The most limiting feature of this 
system is the appeals process in which an injured patient must appeal 
to yet another administrative panel and prove the health court’s ruling 
was arbitrary and capricious in order for the ruling to be set aside.132 
The “arbitrary and capricious” standard is one of the U.S. legal system’s 
most stringent standards of proof and places an almost insurmountable 
barrier in the path of a patient seeking legal redress for his or her 
injuries.133 From the injured patient’s perspective, this system of 
adjudication seems heavily swayed in favor of the medical provider and 
insurer. 
The second downside is the high probability that health courts are 
unconstitutional.134 The courts deny an injured patient a right to try 
his case before a jury, which potentially violates the U.S. Constitution 
and the constitutions of 48 states.135 In addition, by removing medical 
negligence cases from the civil trial courts, health courts violate state 
and federal guarantees of open courts and the right-to-remedy 
 







133. LEE MODJESKA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6:14 
(1982) (noting ”[r]eview of agency action for arbitrariness, capriciousness, 
or abuse of discretion entails a highly deferential standard of review which 
presumes the validity of agency action and requires affirmance if the 
action is supported by a rational basis.”). 
134. Amy Widman, Why Health Courts Are Unconstitutional, 27 PACE L. REV. 
55, 87 (2006). 
135. Hochberg, supra note 127, at 52. 
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provisions found in the constitutions of 40 states.136 Finally, the court’s 
cap on non-economic damages would be unconstitutional in at least 14 
states which have already struck down such tort reform efforts.137 So, 
while the goals of the Health Court initiative are admirable (increasing 
patients’ rates of bringing claims, improving the accuracy and 
consistency of judgments, and reducing the system’s sometimes 
interminable delays)138, the process by which the health court reform 
achieves these goals is inherently flawed and not in keeping with the 
American judicial system’s process for redressing grievances. 
3. Mandatory Arbitration Fails to Provide the Physician, Insurer, and 
Defense Counsel Their Desired Day in Court 
Arbitrating medical malpractice disputes has many potential 
benefits for both claimants and physicians. Among the advantages cited 
are: (1) the quality of the decision-maker; (2) the speed of resolution; 
(3) the reduced litigation expenses; and (4) potentially reducing 
problems with experts.139 According to Professor Thomas B. Metzloff, 
who spent five years researching the feasibility of arbitration within the 
context of medical malpractice litigation, “[a] flexible arbitration 
program employing use of other ADR methods in appropriate cases, 
qualified decision-makers, and perhaps neutral experts would be as 
likely-and indeed in my view more likely-to generate reliable and 
consistent results at a significantly lower cost than the current 
system.”140 
Without getting too far into the weeds of arbitration, arbitration 
does afford the above-mentioned advantages. The parties choose the 
arbiter by agreement; either a panel of arbiters or a single individual.141 
This presumably allows the parties to choose an individual or group of 
individuals with expertise in the area of medical malpractice who will 
not need a lengthy, in-depth education on the medical issues presented 




138. Peters, supra note 106, at 248–49, 258–59. 
139. See Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Potential of Malpractice 
Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 203, 204 (1996) (discussing the 
benefits of arbitration in medical malpractice cases and why the use of 
arbitration has not become predominant due to factors including judicial 
hostility, failure of state statutes designed to encourage arbitration, and 
lack of hard evidence that arbitration works). 
140. Id. at 227. 
141. Id. at 223. 
142. David Allen Larson & David Dahl, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Not 
Business as Usual, 8 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 69, 78–79 (2016) (noting 
that some writers do not believe lay juries possess the competence to 
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during which the arbitration will be conducted.143 Generally, most 
medical malpractice arbitrations last less than one year, as opposed to 
the typical litigation case which can last anywhere from two to five 
years.144 Finally, discovery and evidentiary rules may be truncated or 
revised to allow for more flexibility in presenting the facts to the arbiter 
or panel.145 These characteristics do lead to qualified decision-makers, a 
faster litigation process, and less legal expenses, however, despite these 
benefits, arbitration is still not widely used in the context of medical 
malpractice cases.146   
While many presume that plaintiffs’ attorneys and patients are the 
main reason arbitration is not used in medical malpractice cases, the 
truth is that physicians, defense attorneys, and malpractice insurers are 
the ones reluctant to leave the safety and predictable bias of the 
courtroom.147 As numerous studies have shown, many of the assumed 
advantages of arbitration may not be as compelling to physicians. First, 
litigation outcomes are generally quite positive for physicians. Juries 
find for physicians in nearly eighty percent of cases.148 Moreover, there 
is evidence doctors win malpractice actions only about half as often 
when judges decide cases compared to when juries decide.149 Second, 
physicians generally are shielded from litigation expenses by 
malpractice insurance.150 Thus, arguments about the reduced costs of 
 
decide medical malpractice cases and that by allowing specialist neutrals 
to decide medical tort cases, scholars believe the results will be more 
accurate). 
143. Metzloff, supra note 139. 
144. David H. Sohn & Sonny Bal, Medical Malpractice Reform: The Role of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 470 CLINICAL ORTHOPEDICS AND RELATED 
RES. 1371, 1373 (2012). 
145. Metzloff, supra note 139, at 208. 
146. Larson & Dahl, supra note 142, at 70, 89. 
147. Id. at 71, 82. 
148. Kenneth A. DeVille, The Jury Is Out: Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration 
Agreements for Medical Malpractice Claims, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 
368 (2007). 
149. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1474 
(2007) (finding that malpractice claimants had significantly less success 
in front of juries than they had before judges—malpractice plaintiffs won 
50% of their bench trials, but only 29% of their jury trials)). 
150. Larson & Dahl, supra note 142, at 81–82. (noting that “an aggrieved 
patient usually needs to retain an attorney willing to pay litigation 
expenses until settlement . . . [leading to ] three consequences for the 
patient: (1) the patient is unlikely to find an attorney willing to take even 
a clear case of malpractice if the damages are small; (2) even if damages 
are high, and it seems malpractice occurred, an attorney still will not take 
the case unless the chance of winning justifies the expense of suing; and 
(3) even if the patient triumphs in court, her award will be substantially 
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arbitration are not persuasive to physicians. Finally, physicians are very 
wary of compromise judgments and awards in malpractice cases. The 
perception that arbitration often results in a compromise decision 
makes arbitration uniquely unattractive to physicians seeking complete 
vindication for both professional and personal reasons.151 As mentioned 
earlier, physicians are deeply fearful of being reported to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank, and therefore are compelled to seek the 
complete vindication offered by the court system rather than a potential 
compromised settlement which would trigger the NPDB reporting 
requirement.152 
So, despite the facts that (1) the validity of medical malpractice 
arbitration agreements is recognized by statute in thirteen states, (2) 
all fifty states have enacted statutes ensuring the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements in general, and (3) the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act expansively in order to uphold 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements, routine use of arbitration in the 
context of medical malpractice remains elusive.153 In order for 
arbitration to become the go-to mechanism for resolving medical 
malpractice claims, the bias in favor of physicians inherent in today’s 
court system needs to be resolved. 
 As A. Russell Localio and his team noted in 1991: 
Although malpractice litigation may fulfill its social objectives 
crudely, support for its preservation persists in part because of 
the perception that other methods of ensuring a high quality of 
care and redressing patients’ grievances have proved to be 
inadequate. The abandonment of malpractice litigation is unlikely 
unless credible systems and procedures, supported by the public, 
are instituted to guarantee professional accountability to 
patients.154 
Unfortunately, the latest efforts to improve the reliability of expert 
testimony (utilizing Daubert to establish standard of care, the creation 
of health courts, and mandating binding arbitration) have failed to 
persuade the courts or garner industry and public support. Going 
 
reduced after litigation expenses are paid . . . [leading to] the perception 
that litigation is a more favorable dispute resolution process for medical 
practitioners than less costly arbitration”). 
151. Id. at 84–85 (noting that “[a]ny money paid on behalf of the physician as 
a result of settlement, judgment, or arbitration award . . . must be 
reported to the state medical board in many states as well as the National 
Practitioner Data Bank”). 
152. Id. at 85 (noting the regulatory environment makes arbitration uniquely 
unattractive to physicians seeking complete vindication for both 
professional and personal reasons). 
153. Id. at 74–75, 89. 
154. Localio et al., supra note 46, at 250. 
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forward, reform efforts should focus on improving the functionality of 
the court system. 
IV. Medical simulation: a mediation tool to reform 
medical malpractice litigation 
The problems of inaccurate jury verdicts, damage to the reputation 
of competent providers, and lack of access to the legal system for 
potential plaintiffs are not intractable. This Part suggests a new reform: 
mandatory medical simulation (MMS). 
In the past, exclusive reliance on medical experts was justified 
because there was no other means of establishing the standard of care. 
However, new technology has significantly improved the ability to 
extrapolate the standard of care, allowing the practice of medicine to 
become increasingly more evidence-driven.155 Adopting an MMS model 
holds the promise of making outcomes of medical malpractice suits more 
just, predicated on metrics that are reliable and predictable. This Part 
describes medical simulation and suggests a model for implementing it 
as a mediation tool in medical malpractice cases. 
A. What is Medical Simulation? 
A simulation is the imitation of a situation or process.156 Simulation 
technology has long been utilized in high hazard industries. Pilots and 
astronauts use flight simulators that emulate the cockpit of planes and 
space shuttles to train on what to do in case of system or equipment 
malfunctions, nuclear power plants run simulation drills that train 
personnel on what to do if an earthquake happens and damages key 
components of the reactor, and the military employs war games to 
desensitize and train soldiers for combat conditions.157 High hazard 
industries utilize simulation because it is the best way to train in a safe 
surrounding.158 Simulation allows the participant to practice the same 
skill or technique repeatedly and learn from past mistakes, thus 
 
155. Hines, supra note 61, at 1. 
156. Simulation, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/ 
simulation?s=t [https://perma.cc/4DHP-NHFD]. 
157. S. Barry Issenberg et al., Simulation Technology for Health Care 
Professional Skills Training and Assessment, 282 J. Am. Med. Ass’n. 861, 
861 (1999); Abdulmohsen H. Al-Elq, Simulation-Based Medical Teaching 
and Learning, 17 J. FAM. CMTY. MED. 35, 36 (2010) (noting that the 
aviation and aerospace industries have utilized simulation as a teaching 
tool for many years, and that simulators are widely used in the education 
and training in a variety of high-risk professions including the military, 
commercial airlines, nuclear power plants, and business). 
158. Amitai Ziv et al., Simulation-Based Medical Evaluation: An Ethical 
Imperative, 78 ACAD. MED. 783, 783 (2003). 
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programming the brain to make the correct decisions in a real 
scenario.159 
While it has taken awhile, simulation is becoming more 
commonplace within the health care context.160 Simulation in health 
care means utilizing technology for the replication of specific aspects of 
the clinical world.161 The category of “medical simulation” includes a 
myriad of low-fidelity and high-fidelity technology, including 
standardized patients, partial-task trainers, mannequins, screen-based 
computer simulators, and virtual reality simulators.162 Simulators are 
classified as low- to high-fidelity based on how closely they imitate the 
circumstances under which the skill is typically performed.163 
Standardized patients are actors trained to simulate various symptoms, 
provide medical histories, and display emotions during the medical 
exam.164 Partial-task trainers are used to teach specialized skills.165 
These devices “replicate the elements of the particular psychomotor 
task.”166 Examples include “simulators for laparoscopic surgery or 
endoscopy, or endovascular (catheter-based) procedures.”167 Simpler 
versions include the “IV arm” used to practice drawing blood or 
inserting IV catheters.168 
The full-body mannequin is a high-fidelity (life-like) simulator that 
mimics certain medical conditions by producing various signs and vitals 
generated by a computer.169 In this simulator, the computer can cause 
the mannequin to emulate the data streams available from electronic 
monitors (i.e., electrocardiograms, pulse oximeters and invasive blood 
pressures).170 The simulator’s computer “can be controlled either 
 
159. Id. at 784–85. 
160. Id. at 784. 
161. JEFFREY F. DRIVER ET AL., THE BENEFITS OF USING SIMULATION IN RISK 
MANAGEMENT & PATIENT SAFETY, PRINCIPLES OF RICKS MANAGEMENT & 
PATIENT SAFETY, 351 (Jones and Barlett Learning 2011). 
162. Bharath Chakravarthy et al., Simulation in Medical School Education: 
Review for Emergency Medicine, 12 WEST J. EMERG. MED. 461 (2010) 
(noting in 2010, that medical schools and the curriculum taught were 
reflective of an emerging trend to use simulation as a teaching tool for 
evaluating and training students). 
163. Al-Elq, supra note 157, at 37. 
164. Chakravarthy et al., supra note 162, at 461. 
165. Id. 
166. BARBARA J. YOUNGBERG, PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND PATIENT 
SAFETY 359, 359 (2011). 
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manually, semi-automatically . . . or using mathematical models of 
physiology and pharmacology.”171 They can talk, breathe, blink, and 
respond either automatically or manually to physical and 
pharmacological interventions.172 This mannequin is useful for training 
on procedures such as intubation, pleural decompression, and 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation.173 
Screen-based simulation presents different clinical scenarios to 
students on computer screens in which the student interacts with the 
virtual patient and takes the patient’s history, directs the physical 
exam, and then evaluates and manages the patient’s case.174 The display 
is “on the screen” and allows the participant to choose various actions 
by clicking on menus, buttons, or sliders.175 The program’s responses 
are not restricted to a specific set of choices, but rather are capable of 
incorporating a large set of possible interventions.176 The screen 
represents the patient while the participant plays the role of the medical 
provider. 
Virtual reality is used for training surgical procedures in fields such 
as general surgery, ear, nose and throat, obstetrics, and orthopedics.177 
According to Barbara Youngberg, an expert in hospital risk 
management, virtual reality is considered the “holy grail” of simulation 
and “allows fully natural interaction of the participants with virtual 
environments so realistic that they could not be distinguished from the 
real world.”178 A common form of virtual reality simulation used in 
medicine involves the use of haptic (touch) feedback to produce feelings 
of resistance when using instruments in a simulated environment.179 
As is evident from the various types of simulators, simulation can 
involve replicating the structural anatomy and physiological processes 
that occur within the human body, replicating the healthcare 
environment and equipment, and even creating a complete computer-
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172. Al-Elq, supra note 157, at 37. 
173. YOUNGBERG, supra note 166. 
174. Chakravarthy et al., supra note 162, at 461–62. 
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178. YOUNGBERG, supra note 166. 
179. Al-Elq, supra note 157, at 37 (“Virtual reality is best described as a 
concept of advanced human-computer interaction. Virtual reality varies 
greatly according to its level of sophistication in its level of realism and 
of the user’s interaction with the virtual environment.”). 
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generated world in which the participant actively interacts.180 Where 
surgeons once practiced on chicken feet or pig carcasses,181 surgeons of 
today use high-fidelity simulators that mimic the organs and skin of 
human bodies, complete with bleeding, breathing, and blinking.182 
B. Current Applications of Medical Simulation 
Medical simulation is so appealing because it allows us to identify 
weaknesses in healthcare delivery without potentially harming patients, 
which translates to improved provider competence and quality health 
care in general.183 Medical simulation is currently used in medical school 
training, risk management root cause analysis, and by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to improve quality of care.184 
According to the Society for Simulation in Healthcare (SSH), over 
500 universities and medical institutions in the United States have 
active simulation programs.185 Medical educators have heralded 
simulators as a success in medical education because their dynamic 
nature helps facilitate heuristic decision-making in students.186 
Emergency medicine residents, who used to have to wait for a patient 
with a specific medical condition to present to the emergency 
department, now use screen-based simulation or a standardized patient 
to practice taking a patient history, directing the physical exam, and 
diagnosing and managing the patient’s care.187 
 
180. Ruth M. Fanning, Medical Simulation: A Holistic Approach to Highly 
Reliable Healthcare, PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY HEALTHCARE (Apr. 6, 
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182. Al-Elq, supra note 157, at 37. 
183. Ziv et al., supra note 158, at 785. 
184. See Fanning, supra note 180; Al-Elq, supra note 157, at 37–38. See 
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that “cognitive biases can be integrated effectively into a simulation 
curriculum and that by using an experiential simulation, learners may be 
exposed to the sources and factors contributing to failures in heuristic 
decisions”). 
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Education and Training to Promote Quality and Safety in Healthcare 38 
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Medical simulation allows the acquisition of clinical skills through 
deliberate practice rather than apprentice style of learning.188 In the 
past, medical training involved the teacher telling the students what 
should be done with a patient who presents with specific complaints. 
With today’s medical simulation, the student is the one dictating what 
should be ordered, what the test results mean, and what course of care 
should be considered.189 If the student makes a mistake and fails to 
comprehend the nature of the patient’s medical condition and provide 
the necessary care, review of the training simulation can highlight the 
moment or moments when the mistake was made and what should have 
been done.190 
The i-Human Patient, a high-performance “healthcare case 
authoring and playback system, can simulate a complete medical 
patient encounter from taking a history, performing physical exams, 
and building and ranking a differential, to ordering and evaluating 
diagnostic tests.”191 It is used by master clinicians, first-year medical 
students, advanced practice nurses, and physician assistants.192 It 
includes over 500 “cases that can be configured to match the level of 
the learner.”193 The cases are designed to allow the participant to 
analyze symptoms and arrive at the correct disease diagnosis, similar 
to what occurs in real patient encounters.194 
Since its start in the early 1990s, medical simulation has grown 
from use in medical education to application within the risk 
management context.195 Central to risk management effectiveness is the 
analysis of root cause and sentinel events.196 As a result, risk 
 
188. Al-Elq, supra note 157, at 37–38. 
189. Id. at 35–37. 
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teach the trainee the implications of the error and allow reactions to 
rectify deviations.”). 
191. Kaplan Acquires i-Human Patients, A Leader in Virtual Interactive 
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management professionals use medical simulation to investigate errors, 
faulty systems, and patient safety concerns.197 Medical simulation has 
been utilized within the context of common risk management concerns 
such as root cause analysis, morbidity and mortality reviews, and failure 
mode and effect analyses.198 Medical simulation is proving to be a 
powerful tool in improving the quality of care in our health care system 
and has already established itself as an effective tool in reducing medical 
errors and their associated costs.199   
AHRQ views the benefits of simulation to include improving the 
safety of patients and providers, focused and near real-time feedback, 
integrated multiple skill components, and the ability to identify gaps in 
technology, procedures, and protocols.200 AHRQ considers the use of 
simulation via virtual reality, standardized patients, in situ simulation, 
and modeling as domains worthy of the use in the health care setting.201 
As a result, AHRQ has approved the use of medical simulators in the: 
(1) training of highly specific procedural skills with part-task trainers; 
(2) training of practitioners on the physiology of the human body using 
full-body mannequins with the ability to program vital signs, blood gas 
exchange, heart sounds, with vocal capability, and intravenous access; 
and (3) training of health care teams when responding to acute care 
environments.202 AHRQ promotes the use of simulators to identify 
 
197. Id. (describing how simulation can be used to avoid hindsight bias by 
allowing events to unfold in real time; noting that the piecemeal fashion 
in which information is provided creates a more realistic construction of 
what transpired. “The investigation can extend from simply ‘who to 
blame’ to what systematic factors contributed to this outcome and are 
likely to recur if the system remains unchanged”). 
198. Id. (citing Sadeq A. Quraishi et al., High-fidelity Simulation as an 
Experiential Model for Teaching Root Cause Analysis, 3 J. GRADUATE 
MED. EDUC. 529–534 (2011)). 
199. About Medical Simulation – Resources, Jobs, Vendors & More . . . , 
HEALTHY SIMULATION.COM, http://www.healthysimulation.com/medical-
simulation/ [https://perma.cc/M65Z-J7QM]. 
200. AHRQ ISSUE BRIEF: HEALTH CARE SIMULATION TO ADVANCE SAFETY: 
RESPONDING TO EBOLA AND OTHER THREATS, THE AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RSCH. AND QUALITY (2015) (discussing the helpful role 
simulation can serve in response to the Ebola virus disease, other emergent 
epidemic challenges, provider and patient safety, and quality of care in 
general). 
201. Id. (noting that over the past 15 years the simulation community has 
witnessed tremendous growth and energy which have translated to 
improvements in patient safety outcomes; attributing this success to a 
greater variety of simulation equipment, approaches, and uses, including 
the use of simulation on site at various healthcare facilities). 
202. Id. 
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breaches in protocol and system vulnerabilities, which can then be used 
to further staff preparedness and training.203 
As the developers of the i-Human Project have noted, “[s]imulation 
in healthcare is emerging as a key tool for education, assessment and 
medical error reduction, and we see it playing a critical and 
exponentially growing role in the future of high-quality, cost-effective 
care.”204 AHRQ agrees and has promoted the use of simulation in health 
care well beyond the training of physicians and other healthcare 
professionals.205 
Given the advances made in medical simulation over the past 
twenty years and its noteworthy success in reducing medical errors and 
improving patient safety, this article suggests medical simulation also 
has the ability to improve the reliability of establishing the standard of 
care in medical malpractice cases. Just as teaching institutions have 
created specialized medical simulations to train medical professionals, 
the legal system can create specialized medical simulation emulating 
the facts of a medical malpractice case to extrapolate the customary 
practice of medical providers. The next Section of this article describes 
how the facts from a medical malpractice case can be used to create a 
medical simulation. 
C. Creating a Medical Malpractice Simulation 
MMS envisions that the facts involved a medical malpractice case 
would be incorporated into a case-specific medical simulation. 
Individuals experienced with creating simulations—simulation 
programmers—with the aid of the parties’ medical experts, would 
review the relevant medical records, deposition testimony, and witness 
statements and create an interactive simulation similar to those used 
in medical education training and ARHQ’s safety and error detection 
efforts.206 Since the majority of malpractice cases involve the 
 
203. Id. (“Starting in 2006, AHRQ initiated a grant program to advance 
knowledge of how simulation can improve patient safety across diverse 
health care disciplines, settings, and populations. Grant awards have been 
made on a steady basis . . . since the program launch. Representative of 
the diversity were awards that focused on central venous catheter 
insertion, diagnosis of melanoma, obstetric emergency response drills, 
pediatric airway management, rapid response teams, acute coronary 
syndrome management in rural settings, patient care hand-offs, virtual 
reality team training, and disclosure of medical error”). 
204. KAPLAN, supra note 191. 
205. THE AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RSCH. AND QUALITY, supra note 
200 (noting that a key to effective use of simulation begins with problem 
analysis – identifying when there is a strong and direct relationship 
between the training content and the performance demands placed on 
providers. Thus, the essential first step is identifying what needs to be 
trained). 
206. Id. 
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misdiagnosis of the medical condition,207 the following malpractice fact 
pattern is provided for illustrative purposes: 
A 71-year-old woman presents to an emergency department (ED) 
complaining of severe lower left flank pain. The patient is 
complaining of nausea. Patient has no dysuria, hematuria, or 
fever. She has a past medical history of rheumatoid arthritis, 
myotonic dystrophy stage 2, multiple previous infections 
including MRSA bacteremia, a stage IV decubitus ulcer on her 
coccyx, and a DVT in the common femoral vein. The site of the 
pain is red but no cellulitis is present. 
Based on these presenting symptoms, a provider might instruct the 
simulation to order a CBC panel and urinalysis. If those tests were 
ordered in the medical malpractice case, the simulation would provide 
the test results (i.e., the initial CBC shows an elevated WBC count of 
18.5 and the straight catheter urinalysis shows trace leukocytes and 
some WBC). In the medical record, it was noted that the patient’s 
husband, a retired physician, requested that a C-reactive protein (CRP) 
level be done. The simulation would mimic this communication with 
the provider and the participant would have to determine whether this 
test should be ordered. If the provider agrees and orders the test, if the 
results are within the medical record they will be provided to the 
participant. In this case, the CRP level was done and the results were 
a CRP of 303.1. 
Based on the information provided thus far, the patient was 
showing signs of infection, but the source of the infection was still 
unclear. A physician going through this simulation might instruct the 
program to order a urine culture to confirm a possible UTI and/or a 
blood culture to check for the recurrence of a MRSA bacteremia 
infection. Once the test results come back, the physician can determine 
what next steps to take.   
In the malpractice case, the physician incorrectly assumed the 
source of the infection was a UTI and only ordered the urine culture.208 
The patient was placed on antibiotics to treat the UTI and further 
 
207. Niki Carver et al., Medical Error, NAT CTR FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INFORMATION (February 16, 2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK430763/ (referencing the Emergency Medicine Closed Claims 
Study that found issues related to diagnosis constituted the majority of 
cases, including failure to diagnosis, delayed diagnosis or an incorrect 
diagnosis. Other contributing factors include failure to order appropriate 
tests and/or to address abnormal results, and failure to use clinical 
information and establish the differential diagnosis). 
208. While this information is taken from a medical malpractice case that 
settled, a specific citation to the case was omitted to insure privacy for all 
involved. The omission of patient, physician, and facility identifiers 
illustrates how the deidentification of the medical malpractice facts allows 
the simulation to be used later for training purposes. 
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blood work showed a decline in her WBC. However, when the urine 
culture came back negative, the physician changed the diagnosis from 
a UTI to pain management issues due to the patient’s underlying 
rheumatoid arthritis. This decision failed to address the patient’s 
presenting symptoms of an elevated WBC and extremely elevated CRP 
value. As a result, the patient was discharged from observation with no 
antibiotics and died two days later from sepsis.209 
The goal of using medical simulation in medical malpractice cases 
is to determine whether other practitioners faced with this patient 
would have made the same decision(s) as the provider in question. 
Would other providers have ordered a blood culture at the same time 
as the urine culture, or if not at that point, would they have ordered it 
when the urine culture came back negative? Most importantly, would 
other providers have discharged this patient without antibiotics? 
By analyzing the way other providers react to this patient 
encounter and statistically analyzing the results, the medical simulation 
is able to extrapolate the most probable standard of care that should 
have been applied in this case. 
D. Medical Simulation as a Mediation Tool in Medical Malpractice 
Cases 
A medical simulation has the potential to be a valuable tool in 
addressing reliability of expert witness testimony. Here is how it would 
work: once a simulation is created based on the facts of the case, and 
both parties agree to its contents, the simulation would be submitted 
to either the state medical licensing board for inclusion in either a 
periodic license review exam or the yearly mandatory continuing 
medical education (CME) credits, or to the medical specialty boards for 
inclusion in their recertification exams. The malpractice simulation will 
be hidden within a group of actual recertification case simulations 
presented to medical providers who are attempting to get recertified in 
their specific specialties. This is similar to the way bar exam drafters 
test the validity of new questions by hiding them within the actual bar 
exam administered to law school graduates.210 The new questions do 
not count toward the student’s score, but the student’s answer is 
analyzed to confirm whether the question is valid and can be used on 
the next bar exam as a legitimate question counting for credit.211 
By hiding the simulation in the recertification exam, two important 
goals are achieved: (1) it is verified that the providers who experience 
the simulation are competent medical practitioners with the skills and 
knowledge to actively practice medicine within their specific specialties; 
 
209. Id. 
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and (2) it is ensured that the providers’ responses are their best effort 
to conform to the standard of care. How are these goals achieved? First, 
only the results of practitioners who pass the actual recertification 
simulations will be utilized when extrapolating the standard of care for 
the medical malpractice case. Second, every provider will be 
incentivized to perform at their best because they need a passing grade 
to maintain their licensure or board certification. 
A key advantage to using unknowing providers is they are not 
tainted by financial incentives or hindsight bias. Unlike the typical 
medical expert, the providers going through the recertification medical 
simulations are not paid for their performance. In addition, by allowing 
the event to unfold in real time, and presenting the event in a piecemeal 
fashion, it creates a more realistic reconstruction of what transpired.212 
The simulation is able to present the providers with only the 
information that was available to the defendant at the time of his 
behavior or decision, and thus eliminates the potential for hindsight 
bias.213 This is similar to the way hindsight bias has been removed from 
root cause analyses with the use of simulation. 
What gives MMS more credibility than relying on two paid medical 
experts, aside from its impartiality, is the ability to access the customs 
of practice of more than just one or two providers. Within the 
recertification context, there is the potential to solicit the expertise of 
any number of practitioners, which adds to the statistical reliability of 
the final conclusion in the context of medical malpractice litigation.214 
In order to prevent statistical manipulation, the number of practitioners 
to be included in the MMS should be established by the parties prior 
to administering the simulation, keeping in mind the greater the 
number of participants the more reliable the results.215 
 
212. Fanning, supra note 180, at 4. 
213. See Oeberst & Goeckenjan, supra note 22, at 277 (discussing the 
possibility of limiting information to avoid hindsight bias). 
214. Inter-rater reliability is the level of agreement between raters or judges. 
If only two raters are used and they do not agree the inter-rater reliability 
will be zero, However, if more than two raters are used, there is a greater 
chance that the inter-rater reliability for a binary question will be greater 
than zero, especially if an odd number of raters are being 
used. See Margaret K. Burns, How to establish interrater reliability, 
44 NURSING 56 (2014). For purposes of MMS, Fleiss’ Kappa should be 
utilized as it is a way to measure agreement between three or more raters 
who are chosen at random from a larger population and has the best 
potential to account for chance agreement. Stephanie Glen, Fleiss Kappa, 
STATISTICSHOWTO.COM: ELEMENTARY STATISTICS FOR THE REST OF 
US (July 17, 2016), https://www.statisticsshowto.com/fleiss-kappa/ 
[https://perma.cc/7YF8-3VVX]. 
215. Statistical significance helps quantify whether a result is likely due to 
chance or to some factor of interest. When a finding is significant it means 
you can feel confident that its real and not just a matter of chance in 
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Results of the MMS would be videotaped for review by the parties. 
The simulation would likely produce one of four possible results: (1) the 
majority of the practitioners conducted the patient encounter in 
substantially the same manner as the defendant provider indicating no 
deviation from the standard of care; (2) the majority of the practitioners 
conducted the patient encounter in a substantially different manner, 
but all in relatively the same manner, indicating a deviation from the 
standard of care on the part of the defendant practitioner; (3) the 
majority of the practitioners conducted the patient encounter in one 
way while the remainder of the practitioners conducted the patient 
encounter in another manner, indicating there may be a majority and 
minority standard of care at issue and if the defendant practitioner 
conformed to either standard there would be no finding of liability; or 
(4) there was no consensus in how the practitioners conducted the 
patient encounter indicating that in this particular medical 
circumstance there is no clearly defined standard of care and thus no 
liability on the part of the defendant practitioner. 
In the proposed MMS, the simulation results would illustrate to the 
parties the customary practice of unbiased, impartial practitioners. In 
terms of timing, if the parties agree, MMS could be employed even 
before a complaint is filed. However, careful consideration should be 
made to the timing of MMS use prior to initial discovery as the defense 
is in a superior position as the holder of the relevant medical records 
and evidence. Ultimately, in order to ensure the most complete set of 
facts from which to create the simulation, the court would typically 
order the use of MMS after initial discovery is complete, but before the 
taking of expert depositions so the parties may avoid some of the 
exorbitant costs associated with litigation. As is the case in mandatory 
mediation, the court would order that the cost of creating the 
simulation be shared equally by the parties. 
Unlike typical mediation where the substance of the mediation 
proceedings is inadmissible at trial, the results from the MMS would be 
admissible. This is because MMS does not involve actual settlement 
discussions. Instead, MMS is employed to motivate the parties to 
engage in reasonable settlement discussions. If, however, settlement 
discussions are unsuccessful, the results of the MMS could be used 
during the trial either by the party’s medical expert to further 
substantiate his position of what is customary practice, or simply as 
demonstrative evidence showing what practitioners generally do when 
confronted with a substantially similar physician-patient encounter. 
 
choosing the sample. With bigger sample sizes, you are less likely get 
results that reflect randomness. Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Statistical 
Significance, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 16, 2016), https://hbr.org/
2016/02/a-refresher-on-statistical-significance [https://perma.cc/QLW9-
J7J3]. 
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Support for the admissibility of experimental evidence and video 
recreations is found in both the rules of evidence and caselaw. 
Experiments to determine how a particular event occurred or did not 
occur are considered substantive evidence, admissible to show cause and 
effect, characteristics, and the like.216 Video animations, now finding 
their way into medical malpractice actions, are considered 
demonstrative evidence.217 For example, a video animation depicting a 
bacterial infection in the heart that spread to the brain was properly 
admitted as demonstrative evidence where a qualified and board-
certified expert testified that the video would be helpful in explaining 
to the jury the general development of a disease in issue.218 
Whether the party uses the videotape as demonstrative or 
substantive evidence would depend on the complexity of the medical 
facts and the party’s ability to meet the admissibility requirements 
dictated by the rules of evidence. It is important to note that, since the 
video is being admitted during a trial, the party introducing the video 
into evidence would be required to prove the video’s authenticity and 
relevance.219 The next Part will discuss how mandatory mediation, an 
 
216. 2 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FED. EVID. § 401:10 (8th ed. 2019) 
(citing Bosse v. State, 400 P.3d 834, 846 (Okla.Crim.App. 2017)) (finding 
that where the record shows that the party sufficiently replicated the 
conditions of the original event to simulate the actual conditions, the 
differences between the experiment conditions and the original event go 
to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, where the differences 
were thoroughly discussed in cross-examination, and were disputed by the 
opposing party’s expert). 
217. See Dillion v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 2002) (In Dillion, a 
patient brought a medical malpractice action alleging the physician failed 
to completely remove a catheter that he had inserted in the patient’s vein. 
The plaintiff sought admission of a video animation depicting a bacterial 
infection in the heart that spread to the brain. The trial court allowed the 
video as demonstrative evidence helpful in explaining to the jury the 
general development of endocarditis. On appeal, the defendants 
challenged the admission of the video tape. The Illinois Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court’s admission of the video concluding that it was: (1) 
admitted as demonstrative evidence; (2) a qualified and board-certified 
physician testified that the video would be helpful to the jury in explaining 
a complex medical condition; and (3) the defendants had the right and 
opportunity to cross-examine the physician “so as to assure that the 
videotape could not have misled or confused the jury”); see also Wipf v. 
Kowalski, 519 F.3d 380, 387 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in admitting videotape of doctor performing 
a normal laparoscopic cholecystectomy and other visual aids showing 
“normal” biliary anatomy, in patient’s medical malpractice action against 
doctor who cut patient’s common bile duct instead of the cystic duct; 
video was relevant to doctor’s effort to refute patient’s expert witness’s 
opinion that her technique did not comport with the standard of care). 
218. See Dillion, 771 N.E.2d at 492–94. 
219. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
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alternative dispute resolution tool already employed by courts, can be 
used as the template to institute MMS. 
E. Mandatory Mediation as the Template for Mandatory Medical 
Simulation 
The use of MMS as a mediation tool is premised on the success of 
mandatory mediation in both implementation and results. Traditional 
mandatory mediation is successful because it improves the efficiency of 
the legal proceedings, and as a result, courts are willing to exercise the 
power to order mediation and to compel the attendance of the necessary 
parties.220 The court’s authority to compel participation in mediation is 
derived from either a contractual obligation to mediate, a state statute 
or court rule, or the court’s inherent power.221 Important to note, 
mandatory mediation is non-binding and offers the parties the 
opportunity to identify the issues and attempt early resolution of the 
malpractice claims.222 Furthermore, mandatory mediation is currently 
used in a number of states to help resolve medical malpractice cases 
before going to trial.223 Because mandatory mediation is already a 
commonly used and generally accepted dispute resolution tool within 
the context of medical malpractice cases, it would not be difficult to 
expand the current mandatory mediation statutes/rules to include the 
authority to compel MMS.224 
MMS is very similar to mandatory mediation—the main difference 
being that in MMS the human mediator is replaced by a simulation. 
MMS aligns with the mediator’s role in classic mandatory mediation by 
helping to facilitate the parties’ understanding of the nature of the 
dispute.225 In cases where MMS can be utilized, cases where the medical 
error is a failure to diagnose, the administration of the wrong 
 
220. SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 9:2 
(discussing how Courts uphold the power to compel mediation and 
consider it as an acceptable part of the litigation process and noting that 
challenges to judicially compelled mediation are rare. In fact, the United 
States Supreme Court has rejected challenges to ADR procedures 
reasoning that, new devices are necessary to adapt the ancient institution 
to present needs and to make it an efficient instrument in the 
administration of justice). 
221. Id. 
222. RICHARD M. CALKINS & FRED LANE, Mediation Practice Guide § 2.01 
(Aspen 2008). 
223. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.108 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 
(2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100 (West 2020). See, e.g., WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §7.70.100(1) (West 2013) (requiring all causes of action 
arising from damages caused as a result of health care shall be subject to 
mandatory mediation). 
224. See Appendix A for an example of the statutory language needed to 
implement MMS. 
225. See Metzloff, supra note 139, at 218. 
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medication or treatment, and most surgery-related errors, MMS 
provides the same potential for efficiency and fact clarification that 
typical mediation accomplishes today. 
An important feature of MMS that distinguishes it from other 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms such as the Health 
Courts and Arbitration Panels is that it keeps the case within the trial 
court setting. For example, if one party is concerned the facts utilized 
to create the simulation are incomplete or inaccurate, this issue can be 
presented to the court for a ruling. Similarly, if a party feels the facts 
of the malpractice case are not amenable to simulation, the party can 
motion the court and present arguments supporting that position.226 
Hence, parties are still afforded the impartiality of the trial court as a 
mechanism for settling procedural disputes, and the rulings of the trial 
court are appealable under the same standards as typical lower court 
decisions, unlike the appeal procedure afforded by health courts.227 
F. Potential Hurdles to Implementing Mandatory Medical Simulation 
There are possible hurdles to implementing MMS—namely, the 
need for legislative action, the need for cooperation from the various 
specialty boards, and the good faith participation by practitioners. A 
key component to MMS is the utilization of impartial practitioners 
within the same specialty as the defendant practitioner. Thus, MMS 
would require: (1) revisions to the State Licensing Act governing the 
licensing requirements for healthcare professionals; and/or (2) 
cooperation with the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS).228 
 
226. Limits to MMS utilization will be addressed in section G below.  
227. Hochberg, supra note 127, at 45. 
228. See Enhancing the Quality of Care Through Certification, 
ABMS, https://ww.abms.org/member-boards/[https://perma.cc/DZ69-
5MUDw] (last visited Dec. 23, 2020). The 24 ABMS Member Boards 
include: 
American Board of Allergy and Immunology, American Board of 
Anesthesiology, American Board of Colon and Rectal Surgery, 
American Board of Dermatology, American Board of Emergency 
Medicine, American Board of Family Medicine, American Board 
of Internal Medicine, American Board of Medical Genetics and 
Genomics, American Board of Neurological Surgery, American 
Board of Nuclear Medicine, American Board of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, American Board of Ophthalmology, American Board 
of Orthopaedic Surgery, American Board of Otolaryngology - 
Head and Neck Surgery, American Board of Pathology, American 
Board of Pediatrics, American Board of Physical Medicine and 
Rehabilitation, American Board of Plastic Surgery, American 
Board of Preventive Medicine, American Board of Psychiatry and 
Neurology, American Board of Radiology, American Board of 
Surgery, American Board of Thoracic Surgery and American 
Board of Urology. 
 Id. 
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While statutory changes require legislative commitment to MMS, they 
are not beyond the means of the legislature, and the cooperation of the 
medical specialty boards will only help to ensure those practitioners are 
judged in a fair, reliable, and predictable setting by impartial peers. 
Therefore, these hurdles are not insurmountable and the reward at the 
finish line is the significant improvement in the adjudication of medical 
malpractice cases and the practice of medicine within the United States. 
1. Specialty-Specific Simulation CME Requirements Under the State 
Medical Licensing Act 
Every state has laws and regulations that govern the practice of 
medicine and outline the responsibilities of the medical board in 
regulating that practice.229 These regulations are laid out in a statute, 
usually called the Medical Practice Act.230 State medical boards 
establish the standards for the profession through their interpretation 
and enforcement of the state Medical Practice Act.231 The primary 
mission of medical boards is to protect the public from incompetent, 
unprofessional, and improperly trained physicians.232 Medical boards 
accomplish this by ensuring that only qualified physicians are licensed 
to practice medicine and that those physicians provide their patients 
with a high standard of care.233 
In order to obtain these impartial practitioners, the state’s Medical 
Licensing Act would need to be amended to require that a specified 
portion of the required CME credits be obtained through medical 
simulation programs specific to the provider’s area of practice (i.e., 
internal medicine, cardiology, emergency medicine, etc.). This is 
different from the current CME requirements which only require 
practitioners to attend a specified number of approved CME hours per 
 
229. Drew Carlson & James N. Thompson, The Role of State Medical 
Boards, 7 VIRTUAL MENTOR 311 (2005) (“State medical boards are the 
agencies that license medical doctors, investigate complaints, discipline 
physicians who violate the medical practice act, and refer physicians for 




233. Id. at 312. “After physicians are licensed in a given state, they must 
reregister periodically to maintain their active status. During this 
reregistration process, physicians are required to demonstrate that they 
have maintained acceptable standards of ethics and medical practice and 
have not engaged in improper conduct. In most states, physicians must 
also show that they have participated in a continuing medical education 
program.” 
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reporting period.234 This new, heightened requirement would mandate 
that the providers participate in medical simulation activities within 
their field of expertise and that they obtain a passing rating for the 
simulation(s) in order to maintain their licensure. 
Pushback from the medical community is likely, especially from 
practitioners who have been in practice for a considerable amount of 
time and who have limited exposure or experience with medical 
simulation or a generalized distaste and distrust of emerging 
technology. However, despite the potential for resistance to this 
requirement, the predicted public health benefits and increased 
reliability and predictability of jury verdicts justify a change of this 
magnitude. Furthermore, any reluctance on the provider’s part should 
be eased by the fact that MMS can provide practitioners with a sense 
of security that they will only be held responsible for utilizing the 
applicable standard of care as demonstrated by their impartial peers 
and that a single medical expert opinion will no longer be the sole 
determinant of liability. 
Furthermore, this type of recertification standard is commonplace 
in other high-risk industries, and adoption in the healthcare setting 
seems only logical given that the technology exists to implement it 
effectively.235 According to Amitai Ziv, the founder and director of 
MSR—the Israel Center for Medical Simulation, “more medical 
professional boards may eventually include sophisticated simulation-
based performance assessments in their routine certification and 
recertification procedures.”236 
As Barry Furrow states in one of the leading textbooks on health 
law and policy, “[l]icensure boards currently reflect the traditional way 
that we know what appropriate care is; i.e., the customary practice of 
the majority of practitioners . . . ” 237 By combining the licensure 
 
234. Continuing Medical Education: CME State Requirements, BOARD VITALS 
BLOG (December 17, 2018), https://www.boardvitals.com/blog/cme-
requirements-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/E4MM-6X5R]. 
235. Ziv et al., supra note 158, at 785 (noting that “[t]he model for simulation 
use in a systematic, career-long approach already exists in aviation.”). 
236. Id. See also Liang, supra note 37, at 563 (“We need to mandate systems-
based, patient safety and error reduction, continuing medical education 
for individual providers. Again, this is not optional. This is a critical part 
of patient care. It is as important as keeping up on the literature. It is as 
important as keeping up on your clinical skills. You need to keep your 
patients safe. You need to render care to them in the best manner you 
know how, both in terms of safety and efficacy; therefore, you as an 
individual provider have an obligation to learn about and participate in 
this patient safety stuff, too”). 
237. FURROW, supra note 70, at 35 (discussing how the Affordable Care Act 
requires reliance on scientific evidence of effectiveness and outcomes as 
the measure for quality and how this shift will have implications for 
standard setting by health professional boards). 
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requirement of CME with the MMS need for unbiased, qualified 
practitioners within the same specialty as the defendant provider, we 
achieve a symbiotic relationship in which “[t]he boards’ heavy reliance 
on the participation of their licensees advances the public interest by 
bringing expertise to the evaluation of professionals’ competency and 
behavior.”238 
2. Cooperation of the Various Medical Certification Boards 
The cooperation of the medical boards would be a valuable 
component in the success of the MMS concept. While every physician 
must be licensed to practice medicine, board certification is a voluntary 
process.239 Medical licensing sets the minimum competency 
requirements to diagnose and treat patients and is not specialty-
specific.240 Board certification, on the other hand, is considered the gold 
standard in terms of illustrating that providers have the skills, 
knowledge, and expertise to practice within their particular specialty.241 
As a result, the vast majority of medical experts utilized during medical 
malpractice litigation are board-certified practitioners.242 
The legitimacy of medical boards is derived from their member 
status in ABMS.243 Instead of an ad hoc attempt to obtain the 
cooperation of each independent medical specialty board, the best 
avenue for inducing participation by the medical boards is to make 
participation a condition of ABMS membership. Specifically, each 
specialty board would be expected to require its members to periodically 
participate in medical simulation recertification exams. 
Currently, ABMS has twenty-four specialty boards as members, 
ranging from American Board for Allergy and Immunology to the 
American Board for Urology.244 ABMS is likely to experience the same 
pushback from providers as the state medical licensing boards, but 
 
238. Id. at 34 (discussing how the current era of intense competition among 
healthcare professionals creates opportunities for anticompetitive conduct 
facilitated by the authority of the board and that this traditional rationale 
for health care quality regulation should shift to reliance on health care 
data and consumer access to quality information). 
239. Board Certification and Maintenance of Certification, AM. BD. OF 
MED. SPECIALTIES (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.abms.org/board-
certification/ [https://perma.cc/2EUX-L3GU]. 
240. Id. 
241. Brendan Murphy, Licensing and Board Certification: What Residents 
Need to Know, AM. MED. ASS’N (May 22, 2019), https://www.ama-
assn.org/residents-students/transition-practice/licensing-and-board-
certification-what-residents-need-know [https://perma.cc/2EUX-L3GU]. 
242. D. Bowen-Barry, The Physician’s Guide to Medical Malpractice, 
14 PROC BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. 109–12 (2001). 
243. AM. BD. OF MED. SPECIALTIES, supra note 239. 
244. Id. 
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unlike the licensing boards, board certification is not a requirement to 
practice medicine.245 However, board certification is important to 
physicians because patients, insurers, and quality organizations look to 
board certification as an indicator of a physician’s knowledge, 
experience, and skills to provide quality health care within a given 
specialty.246 In addition, many hospitals require board certification as a 
condition for receiving privileges.247 Therefore, physician pushback 
should not be viewed as a reason to abandon this reform effort and, in 
fact, similar to the medical licensing board’s responsibility to the public 
to police its profession, medical specialty boards have an equal 
responsibility to ensure that providers who claim board status have the 
competencies attributed to board certification.248 
G. The Benefits of Mandatory Medical Simulation 
MMS has the potential to reduce the exorbitant costs associated 
with medical malpractice litigation, increase patient access to the legal 
system by improving the predictability of jury verdicts and the 
reliability of expert witness testimony, reduce the practice of defensive 
medicine by utilizing the expertise of impartial, unbiased medical 
providers to verify the applicable standard of care, and reduce medical 
errors by creating training modules based on actual malpractice fact 
patterns which all providers can use to improve their clinical skills. 
Ultimately, MMS has the potential to improve the integrity of the legal 
system and the quality of health care in the United States. 
First, providing both parties an opportunity to witness the 
customary practice of unbiased practitioners within the same specialty 
as the defendant may motivate them to settle the dispute earlier in the 
litigation process. Knowing that the trial court can order MMS, and 
that the results could be used during the trial, should persuade the 
party with the weaker case to settle before spending excessive amounts 
on expert witnesses. This is especially true when they know the 
testimony of their expert witness(es) will now be subject to greater 
scrutiny based on the MMS results. 
Second, MMS creates a fairer legal environment for plaintiffs by 
eliminating, or at least diminishing, the jury’s inherent physician-bias 
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248. AM. BD. OF MED. SPECIALTIES, supra note 239. 
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paid expert witnesses. Theoretically, the typical physician-bias found in 
the trial court setting will be diminished by the jury’s ability to witness 
the actions of a group of physicians, resulting in more objective 
determinations of the appropriate standard of care. 
Third, by using the MMS to verify the testimony of the medical 
experts retained by the parties, practitioners are assured that they will 
only be held accountable for the actual customary practice of providers 
within their same specialty and not on the opinion of one practitioner. 
Furthermore, if there is confusion over the appropriate standard of care 
to apply in a particular patient encounter, that will be highlighted by 
the results of the MMS, adding to the practitioner’s argument that 
several care options may be available in a given situation. Ultimately, 
knowing that the MMS safety net is present in the adjudication process 
will allow medical practitioners to feel comfortable discontinuing the 
practice of defensive medicine. 
Lastly, the creation of the medical malpractice simulation and its 
use within the recertification context has the potential to reduce 
medical errors by allowing practitioners the opportunity to learn from 
the mistakes of other providers. This is accomplished because each 
malpractice case submitted to MMS would result in a new training 
simulation that could be used to educate future and current 
practitioners on the appropriate standard of care to apply in some of 
the most confusing or complicated cases. Thus, MMS has the potential 
to achieve a tort reform goal that no other tort reform effort has been 
able to master to date: the ability to learn from the medical errors of 
the past and disseminate that knowledge to the broader medical 
community. The next section will identify and address the potential 
limitations of MMS. 
H. Limitations to the Utilization of Mandatory Simulation 
There are foreseeable limitations to the utilization of MMS. These 
include: (1) the assertion of the innovation defense; (2) the lack of 
providers in highly specialized areas of medicine; (3) the difficulty in 
unwinding the medical facts for complicated medical malpractice cases 
in which multiple providers may be responsible for an error; and (4) the 
lag-time created if the need for MMS outpaces the ability to create and 
implement the simulations. 
First, the innovation defense to medical malpractice cases may pose 
a challenge to MMS. This is because an innovative procedure, by 
definition, has not been commonly adopted by the medical 
community.249 Therefore, no customary practice can be deduced from a 
 
249. FURROW, supra note 70, at 252 (discussing how innovation in the clinical 
setting is common and is neither standard nor methodologically 
experimental, but rather aimed ”to help the particular patient of the 
doctor but lacks sufficient evaluation to be able to say that there is ‘a 
reasonable expectation of success’”). 
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medical simulation of an innovative procedure. This limitation can be 
overcome, however, by requiring defendants who assert this defense to 
provide proof of innovation through a detailed informed consent form 
signed by the patient, showing the patient’s acceptance of the 
innovative procedure and its risks.250 
Second, highly specialized areas of medicine with limited numbers 
of practitioners also pose a potential problem for MMS utilization. The 
value MMS adds to the medical malpractice case is access to the 
customary practice of multiple practitioners. In highly specialized areas 
of medicine, there are fewer practitioners available to participate in the 
simulation, potentially making it impossible to effectively run the 
simulation for MMS purposes. 
Third, MMS may be difficult to implement in malpractice cases in 
which multiple providers from different specialties are potentially to 
blame. At the very least, this may require the creation of multiple 
simulations to test each provider’s standard of practice as it relates to 
the malpractice fact pattern. The need to create multiple versions of 
the simulation may make the cost of using MMS too great for the 
parties, especially for a plaintiff who already faces issues with access to 
the legal system due to costs. 
Finally, if it takes too long to create the simulation, or to get the 
results of the simulation because the parties have to wait for the 
recertification exams to take place, or the demand outpaces the ability 
to create and run the simulations, the standard of care that was 
applicable at the time of the alleged negligence may be different from 
the standard of care that is extrapolated during the MMS. To determine 
the true extent of this limitation, further research should be conducted 
to: (1) examine how long it will take to effectively create a simulation 
from the medical facts of a medical malpractice case; (2) determine how 
often CMEs and recertification exams would need to be offered in order 
to fill the demand; and (3) determine how often standards of care 
change to the extent that it would directly impact the effectiveness of 
MMS. 
Despite these limitations, MMS offers considerable benefits to the 
adjudication of medical malpractice cases, and with further research, 
these limitations may be surmounted. 
 
250. BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS, A GUIDE FOR 
CLINICIANS 272 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2013) (discussing how 
innovations that are a major difference from the accepted practice, which 
pose more than minor risks to patients, and which have not been 
previously described in textbooks and articles, should be reviewed by 
peers, and patients should consent to the innovative nature of the 
procedure). 
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Conclusion 
Given today’s technological advances, MMS may be a relatively 
simple answer to correct the unreliable process of establishing the 
standard of care in medical malpractice cases. MMS can provide 
physicians with a sense of security that they will only be held 
responsible for utilizing the applicable standard of care as demonstrated 
by their impartial peers, and thereby reduce the practice of defensive 
medicine and the resulting high health care costs. Furthermore, MMS 
can improve access for injured patients to the legal system by providing 
further impartial evidence of the standard of care and thus leveling the 
scales of justice. Finally, MMS can reduce the exorbitant costs 
associated with defending and prosecuting malpractice claims by 
illustrating to the parties what impartial practitioners view the 
standard of care to be prior to the expenditure of large sums of money 
on paid medical expert witnesses. Considering the majority of medical 
errors occur as a result of misdiagnosis, which is a relatively easy case 
pattern to recreate in the medical simulation context, MMS would be 
a highly effective tool in reforming the medical malpractice system and 
health care in general. 
Appendix A 
Sample statutory Mandatory Medical Simulation language: 
 
(1) Before trial, all causes of action, whether based in tort, contract, or 
otherwise, for damages arising from injury occurring as a result of 
health care provided after [the enacting date], shall be subject to 
mandatory medical simulation prior to trial except as provided in 
subsection (4) of this section. 
 
(2) The supreme court shall by rule adopt procedures to implement 
mandatory medical simulation of actions under this chapter. The 
implementation contemplates the adoption of rules by the supreme 
court which will require mandatory medical simulation without 
exception unless subsection (4) of this section applies. 
 
The rules on mandatory medical simulation shall address, at a 
minimum: 
 
a) Procedures for the appointment of, and qualifications of, 
simulation programmers. A simulation programmer shall have 
experience or expertise related to the creation of medical 
simulations, and be a licensed or certified simulation 
programmer with a minimum of [years of experience]. The 
parties may stipulate to a specific simulation programmer. The 
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court may prescribe additional qualifications of simulation 
programmers; 
 
b) Appropriate limits on the amount or manner of compensation 
of simulation programmers; 
 
 
c) The number of days following the filing of a claim under this 
chapter within which a simulation programmer must be 
selected; 
 
d) The method by which a simulation programmer is selected. The 
rule shall provide for designation of a simulation programmer 
by the trial court if the parties are unable to agree upon a 
simulation programmer; 
 
e) A means by which mandatory medical simulation of an action 
under this chapter may be waived by a simulation programmer 
who has determined that the claim is not appropriate for 
mandatory medical simulation; and 
 
f) Any other matters deemed necessary by the court. 
 
(3) The simulation programmer shall not impose discovery schedules 
upon the parties. 
 
(4) The mandatory medical simulation requirement of subsection (2) of 
this section does not apply to an action in which the court 
determines the medical facts of the case cannot be replicated using 
medical simulation or to an action in which the parties have agreed, 
subsequent to the filing of the claim, that mandatory medical 
simulation would not be appropriate given the medical 
circumstances of the cases. 
 
(5) The implementation also contemplates the adoption of a rule by 
the supreme court for procedures for the parties to certify to the 
court the manner of mandatory medical simulation used by the 
parties to comply with this section. 
